

“The Challenges of Forecasting Intelligence: Reassessing Warnings of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide from a Theoretical Perspective”

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Declaration of authorship

I hereby solemnly declare that I have personally and independently prepared this work. All quotations in the text have been marked as such, and the paper or considerable parts of it have not previously been subject to any examination or assessment.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Mette Kaalby Vestergaard', written in a cursive style.

Abstract

This work questions if re-examining some of the warnings usually presented as early proof of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, can point to new insights in the field of early warning, both in theory and practice. Moreover, it analyses what these insights then mean for the prospects of forecasting and prevention of genocide. More specifically, it examines documents, that by scholars in academia, are argued to be obvious and very high-quality warnings, subsequently reasoning that the lack of prevention of the genocide in Rwanda, resulted from a lack of political will. This research is relevant because of a lack of preventative measures taken in practice to prevent genocides, despite legal and political framework and tools existing for this very purpose.

Applying theory developed on the basis of the warning-response loop by De Franco and Meyer (2011), the work uses the case study of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. From this theoretical starting point, independent variables are developed to determine the degree of respectively certainty, accuracy and specificity of the data. The analysis reveals that the five documents subject to analysis do not manage to perfectly deal with the challenges of forecasting.

Throughout the work, there is furthermore given attention to some central tendencies in the academic literature – most importantly the argument that the Rwandan genocide was a result of a lack of political will to prevent and an obsessive focus on risk factors and indicates as being the cure for all problems. Both tendencies are something that seem to overshadow alternative issues, such as capacity limitations of forecasting, given due to human nature, which this study points to.

The conclusions drawn from this research are that there is an overestimation of human capabilities with respect to forecasting of genocide, in the light of the current legal framework. It is therefore recommended that scholars become more conscious about the underlying assumptions of their work that contributes to shaping of this shortage of recognition. Along with this, the study finally sets out that there is a resulting need for a greater focus on actus reus with respect to genocide prevention, in order to improve the effectiveness in the field.

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List of Abbreviations

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CPPCG - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICC – International Criminal Court
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
MRND – National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
RGF – Rwandese Government Forces
RPF – Rwandan Patriotic Front
UN – United Nations
UNAMIR - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
US – United States
USHMM - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Introduction

Throughout history we have seen the most horrible things happening in the world. Humans doing the most cruel things to each other. This cruelty does not have a nationality, a race or a particular time in history. It has always been like that, even though it is hard to comprehend that it could be part of human nature itself. Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire asks himself the following, in his famous work telling his story about the genocide in Rwanda in 1994:

“Are we all human, or are some more human than others?”¹

Looking over reports and photographs documenting genocides throughout time, one cannot help but wonder as he does. Being of the belief that some are more human than others, will also help one to distance oneself from the idea that all humans are capable of this – and worse, that this means that it can happen again; anywhere, anytime. The Rwandan genocide is often discussed in academic literature and public as being as example of a failure to prevent.² Kofi Annan who was the UN Secretary-General at the time of the genocide, furthermore supports these claims in the following statement: *“If there was a problem, it was not one of information or intelligence. The problem was lack of political will.”*³ Facing the year of the 25th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, the topic of prevention is still as relevant as always. Currently (April 2019) populations in more than 12 countries are at risk of genocide, according to the Genocide Watch.⁴ This should make one consider, and wonder why it is, if so, that only *“(…) after genocide has occurred, many people around the world care very much about the victims”*.⁵ While one can't possibly stress the urgency and importance of addressing these risks, the same goes for understanding the consequences of failing to prevent such horrors. Subsequently, the costs of preventing a genocide is highly worth it, in the light of the costs

¹ Roméo Dallaire, *“Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda”*, Penguin Random House Canada, 1st Edition, (2003), 522.

² Jennifer Welsh, *“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”*, Policy Brief No.1/2009, Oxford Institute for Ethics Law and Armed Conflict, (2009), 3, (Available at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:be376783-283b-4d94-84d1-7d5b8d4176d0/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=ELAC_Policy_Brief_1_2009.pdf&type_of_work=Report).

³ Touko Piiparinen, *“Beyond the Mystery of the Rwanda 'black box': Political will and Early Warning,”* International Peacekeeping, 09/2006, Vol. 13/3, (2006), 334.

⁴ Genocide Watch, *“Peoples at Risk”*, Accessed on April 18, 2019, (Available at: <http://www.genocidewatch.com/countries-at-risk>).

⁵ Israel W. Charney, *“Genocide Volume I”*, ABC-CLIO, (1999), 253.

of intervening when they are ongoing or most importantly up against the unmeasurable human and societal costs in terms of trauma, physical and psychological damage.⁶ It was once noted by the physicist Niels Bohr that “*prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.*”⁷ Albeit, this is what many scholars and practitioners attempt to do - developing early warning systems with the purpose of predicting genocide with the aim of prevention. It is within this field that this work is situated.

Genocide: Law and Politics

In the late 1940s Raphael Lemkin’s efforts resulted in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of the United Nations (UN) on December 9th, 1948.⁸ The obligation to prevent and punish the crime was thus established along with the first legal definition of genocide, which reads as follows in Article II of the Convention, subsequently followed by different acts constituting the crime:

*“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (...)”*⁹

Additionally, there are two elements to the crime, which are respectively *mens rea* and *actus reus*. This means that in contrast to other atrocity crimes, this crime legally requires that the intent to commit genocide exists along with the acts.¹⁰ As of 2018 the CPPCG has been ratified by 149 states.¹¹ The above definition along with the elements of the crime was furthermore adopted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Rome Statute as the definition of genocide with the purpose of punishment of the crime before the court.¹² Hence, efforts are to be found universally all the way from Lemkin’s efforts in 1948, regional and universal establishment of preventative mechanisms and

⁶ United Nations, “*UN Framework for the Analysis of Atrocity Crimes*”, 2014, 1.

⁷ Michael Gropper and Donovan, Anne L. “*Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future-Niels Bohr,*” Critical Care Medical, 39(8), August (2011), 2005.

⁸ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December, (1948).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ United Nations Treaty Collection, Ratification, Accessed on April 12, 2019, (Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=en).

¹² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998), Art. 6.

legal obligations. The latest global effort is the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a norm that covers 3 stages. In these 3 stages it is set out that countries should firstly protect its own citizens, secondly assist other countries in this duty and lastly take action where a host state manifestly fails to protect its own citizens against mass atrocities.¹³ The norm has since been referred to several times by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other relevant actors.¹⁴ Additionally, provisions are also found under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and jurisdiction of different courts.¹⁵ Finally, genocide is often presented as a *jus cogens* norm under international customary law and it has moreover been considered a crime under universal jurisdiction.¹⁶ Practical, political and legal tools for the international community to prevent and intervene in a potential genocide are thus available. One would indeed think that this is preventable regardless of whatever circumstances that might surround it.

Despite these continuous efforts to put up preventative structures and tools, it proves to be an endless endeavour, as it remains a problem to protect people from genocide today. As such, it seems to be an indefinite undertaking to develop timely warning and prevention of genocide. Many works subsequently argue that the lack of prevention of genocide, all comes down to a lack of political will. This has been argued especially with regards to the genocide in Rwanda. Furthermore, it has been argued that when politicians allege that they did not know what was about to happen in 1994, it is not the truth.¹⁷ This implies that more action should be taken. However, it has also been argued that too much warning can possibly have negative effects as it can produce unintended additional risks and damage.¹⁸

¹³ United Nations, *"Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, War crimes, Ethnic cleansing and Crimes against humanity"*, UN Summit Outcome Document, (2005), (Available at: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf>).

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *"Resolution 2399 (2018)/adopted by the Security Council at its 8169th meeting, on 30 January 2018"*, S/RES/2399, 30 January (2018), 1.

¹⁵ United Nations, *"Legal Framework"*, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Accessed on 14 May 2019, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/international-law.shtml>).

¹⁶ Robert Cryer, *"International Criminal Law"*, in Malcolm Evans (Ed.), *"International Law"*, 4th Edition, (2014), 755.

¹⁷ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide"*, HarperCollins, 1st Edition, (2002), 504.

¹⁸ Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer, *"Forecasting, Warning, and Responding to Transnational Risks"*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1st Edition, (2011), 241.

Problem Statement

As set out in the section above, there is a trend to present only one story about Rwanda – the one where the decision-makers were not willing to prevent. This is additionally illustrated in the following statement by Piiparinen (2006): *“According to the conventional wisdom of the current debate on peacekeeping, the failures of the UN security council in general and in Rwanda in particular can be attributed to an absence, not of early warning systems, but of political will on the part of member states.”*¹⁹ This sole reason of no political will to prevent the genocide is rarely questioned, which provides justification for choosing this research topic. This research aims at critically questioning this mainstream interpretation of the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and subsequently providing new insights in the field. Applying the case of Rwanda is thus an attempt to challenge the popular view, of it being a simple question of lack of political will to prevent slaughter in foreign countries. The problem with that conclusion and importance of this research is that this will naturally create a tendency in research that creates a deadlock, as the blame is already placed where it should accordingly be placed. While this is not necessarily wrong, it does not leave much space for analysis of potential underlying theoretical obstacles and paradoxes within warning-response processes, subsequently leaving out the establishment of perspectives and insights, which can contribute to improvement of genocide prevention. This gap is something that cannot solely be filled by this research. However, it will cast some light on it in terms of enlightening about and providing alternative interpretations. The goal and importance of this research lies thus not in criticising or necessarily proving wrong the above-mentioned view, but in facilitating a discussion that will bring forward some of the challenges and potential theoretical implications for early warning of genocide. Hence this research offers a different approach than the one utilized by many scholars, which will be illustrated. Many areas within social science moreover continuously lack credibility and recognition, when it comes to forecasting and warning, in contrast to disciplines who serves to study natural phenomenon, which are moreover better tested in methods based on empiricism and experiments.²⁰ This research additionally and indirectly examines this claim, and will therefore contribute to the research within the field of warning-response, more specifically the scope of forecasting and its linkages to and effects on preventative action.

¹⁹ *Supra* note 3, 334.

²⁰ *Supra* note 18, 245.

Research Question

To enable this research, the following research questions have been developed. Answering the following is thus the main objective of this work:

By re-examining some of the documents, usually presented as good early warning of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which new insights can be drawn and what does it mean for the field of early warning and prevention of genocide, both in theory and practice?

To support the process, three additional sub-questions have been developed in order to operationalize the answering of the main question and moreover provide the reader with a more accessible structure of the work. These three sub-questions are the following:

- 1. How does the data manage to deal with the challenges of forecasting within warning-response processes?*
- 2. Can new insights derived from these findings suggest alternative explanations to this failure to prevent?*
- 3. What do these results mean for the field of warning-response with respect to genocide?*

The research takes an abductive reasoning and works with the case study of Rwanda as its main focus. A theoretical framework developed on the basis of existing literature in warning-response is utilized, enabling a subsequently selection of the variables applied. Operationalization of these variables in a careful manner has enabled a later analysis. The data has been collected through previous studies examining the same case and has thus subsequently been assessed in a qualitative manner.

Structure of the Thesis

The introduction of this work presents the main aim of the research and the importance of this within the field of warning-response, consequently presenting the reader to the problem statement. It moreover lists out the research questions and shortly introduce the approach for the answering of this, along with a subsequent outline of the structure of the thesis.

Following this, chapter I accounts for and discuss literature in the field of warning-response with the purpose of situating this research within this field. It will present different accounts for where the problem of the warning-response gap comes from and moreover give an insight in which sort of research that is mostly conducted. Some of these insights will subsequently be applied in the discussion of the results from this research.

Chapter II presents the research approach that will be utilized in this work. Hence it sets out the reasoning behind the choice of case study. Finally, the research design will be set out along with the subsequent approach to data collection and assessment.

Chapter III shortly introduces the reader to the conflict in Rwanda with the aim of creating a basis of general knowledge of the dynamics at the time. As such, it is a very broad description that serves as a foundation for the further information provided throughout the analysis.

Chapter IV constitutes the main part of this thesis as it analyses the data to produce the findings applied in the discussion. Hence, it analyses the quality of the documents warning about the genocide. Here five different documents will be in-depth analysed along the relevant variables. For the analysis, the approach developed in the section on methodology will be utilized. This chapter will thus furthermore altogether answer the first sub-research question.

Chapter V provides a discussion of the findings derived from the analysis and additionally answers the two latter sub-questions. In the end, the work from the previous chapters will have enabled the answering the main research question, which will be summed up in the final part of the discussion in a separate section.

Chapter VI will provide an evaluation of the work, henceforward a short discussion of its limitations.

A conclusion will lastly evaluate on the research and thesis project as a whole. Finally, ideas for further research are suggested.

Chapter I: Literature Review

This chapter aims at providing the reader with an insight into the field of warning-response from three different perspectives. Firstly, it attempts at drawing a picture of the approaches that has been most popular working within topic in academia. Secondly, different views on what causes the problem of the warning-response gap in practice will be presented. These two outlooks will be assessed in the first part of the literature review and will be discussed as integrated perspectives. A third and more narrow aspect will enlighten the reader in a general manner on some points specifically relevant for warning-response of genocide. This literature review serves as an important basis for the research, as it will point to some general tendencies that are important to recognize for research within this field. As this research questions and aims to evaluate other arguments in the field, it is consequently crucial to provide a comprehensive picture of the existing literature. By situating the research within the greater context of warning response, the reader will be able to get a sense of the position of this research within already existing academic literature. Additional thoughts on this will subsequently be provided in the discussion of this paper.

Schools of Thoughts

Different schools of thoughts can be identified within this academic field. The first of them is the Orthodox School of intelligence studies, which argues that the reason that cognitive problems are an obstacle to effective warning is due to inherent problems within the warnings. Examples of these are both individual cognitive processes and more collective - such as organizational and political and lastly epistemological problems due to the nature of forecasting. Hence this view is built of the assumptions that warning need not to be perfectly accurate or certain, in order to serve their goal, as this is not where the main problem is identified.²¹ On the other hand, the Revisionist School reasons that if quality and effectiveness of the warnings produced are improved this will subsequently lead to better warning processes.²² Hence one focuses a lot on attention on the cognitive aspects of warning-

²¹ Richard K. Betts, "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*," *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(3), (1989), 329, 331.

²² Christoph O. Meyer and Otto, Florian; Brante, John; de Franco, Chiara, "Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4, December (2010), 568.

response processes, while the latter assume that these problems will be solved if the quality of the warning themselves are improved. As a starting point, these perspectives are shared with many of the works presented in this chapter, albeit some of them also introduces additional views and arguments within the field.

Forecasting in Social Science

Scholars have, as already noted, different accounts for what the main problem is and consequently where the efforts should be put in order to improve warning-response processes. As a starting point, an important aspect of warnings and forecasting within social science should be presented. This concerns that it has been noted that the results from these efforts have been unclear, which has subsequently hurt the validity of the field of early warning in social science.²³ That is partly caused by the fact that it is really hard to evaluate the performance of this field, as you are trying to compare what did or did not happen, with something you will never know for sure, that being, what the alternative situation would have been if preventative actions were taken/not taken. This position is important to recognize, as it points to a fundamental paradox that can be identified in a lot of the work presented here. Moreover, it puts this research into perspective as it has taken a step back from this debate and instead attempts to judge, which argument can be considered unfair. Recognizing this point, this research argues that this can to some degree provide supportive argumentation to, what it argues, does not serve as a valid evaluation of failure.

George and Holl (1997) set out six different reasons why the warning response gap exists, based on the assumption that prevention of genocide is possible and that early warning is a precondition for this. These are the as follows: Firstly, there is a perception that low stakes are at risk and secondly, the fact that the events still tend to be uncertain despite existing early warning indicators. Thirdly - lack of analysts with sufficient capacity to interpret the early warnings and fourthly, succeeding reluctance of decision-makers due to cry-wolf tendency. They moreover argue that an overload of information leads to passivity, which is the fifth factor. Lastly, in some cases the decision-makers do

²³ Anna Matveeva, *“Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas,”* European Centre of Conflict Prevention, (2006), 11, (Available at: <https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/127900679/127917167/Issue+paper+1-+Early+Warning+and+Early+Response.pdf>).

understand the seriousness of the threat and do consequently not want to get involved.²⁴ Hence, it is argued that the issue of timing and accuracy is not the main problem at all. Rather, for the decision-makers, there is a risk that a situation will produce more harm, held against only a potential situation. Hence the focus seems to be on the issue of certainty and therefore the very nature and consequences of forecasting in social science. In line with this Steve Chan (1997) argues that there is a crucial importance in the certainty of the information provided and moreover the certainty in the provider of the information. He moreover points attention to the “cry-wolf” syndrome that “*tend to depress confidence in warning forecasts.*”²⁵ Some scholars also present views mainly discussing the nature of prediction in relation to social science, which also has relevance within this field. Following Bernstein et al. (2000) the predictive theory has assumed an analogy between physical and social research which is highly mistaken.²⁶ The difference between the two phenomena is that in physics prediction can be somehow observed and verified through experiments, while for social science, it is argued that a phenomenon cannot be observed through correspondence theories.²⁷ It is subsequently claimed that the way forward for forecasting in international relations theory is not that of prediction, but scenario-building thinking, which enables both the usage of theory but additionally adds the particular context of the phenomenon.²⁸ Hence scenario building is argued to be the best alternative, as it is maintained that accurate prediction is not possible within the field of social science.²⁹ The Organization for Economic CO-operations and Development (OECD) issued a report in 2009, which contained the improvement in early warning systems since the field first started to develop cannot be identified. It is moreover argued that the international community is in no better position today to prevent a genocide than it was back in 1994 when failing to prevent the Rwandan genocide.³⁰ These all presents relatively critical views on early warning and response in this field, as it undermines its potential by pointing to a problem that is there by nature and hence not capable of being directly addressed. These fall in some respects under the Orthodox school, especially in the discussion of

²⁴ Alexander L. George and Holl, Jane E. “*The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities,*” in “*Preventive Diplomacy: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*”, Carnegie Corporation, (1997), 9, 10, (Available at: https://www.carnegie.org/media/filer_public/33/6e/336e40fd-5176-42c2-bb9d-afd7b3b6550a/ccny_report_1997_warning.pdf).

²⁵ Steve Chan, “*The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning*”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, March, (1979), 172.

²⁶ *Supra* note 25, 44.

²⁷ *Supra* note 25, 46.

²⁸ *Supra* note 25, 70.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ David Nyheim, “*Preventing Violence, War and State collapse, The Future of Conflict Early warning and Response,*” OECD, (2009), 13, 15.

epistemology and the related challenges of forecasting. Whether this research supports this sort of critical views on both progress but also the very potential of producing warnings in social science, will also be discussed, which makes these points important to keep in mind throughout the analysis.

Development of Indicators and Triggering Factors

Despite the above presented challenges, the most popular approach to solving the problem of the warning response gap, is the development of precise indicators and factors to establish early warning systems. A relying on the assumption that forecasting social events is possible, at least to a significant degree is present here. An additional underlying assumption of many of these studies is that if these indicators are in place, the rest should follow, because there will resultantly be obvious and explicit warnings. Hence the Revisionist school currently dominates the academic field.

According to Meyer et al. (2010) the most prominent effort has been made in the field of developing indicators and factors that can indicate a risk of the given phenomenon. One of them is John Clarke (2005) who developed structural indicators, proximate indicators and subsequent trigger mechanism. The prior two serve as the basis for preparedness and preventative measures whereas trigger mechanisms will provide foundation for planning of crisis management. Lastly, it is also noted that these indicators should be operationalized for the specific context.³¹ Examples of this has furthermore included both demographic, political environmental, societal and other areas.³² Barbara Harff (2003) uses, especially with respect to genocide, the development of indicators and variables to identify preconditions for genocide and moreover to measure the probability of its occurrence.³³ Ernesto Verdeja (2016) additionally focuses on the structural conditions constituting a risk for genocide and how these can be used for risk assessment. This focus on structural conditions that can constitute a risk, has thus been studied extensively especially for genocide specifically.³⁴ Jenkins and Bond (2011)

³¹ John N. Clarke, "Early Warning Analysis for Humanitarian Preparedness and Conflict Prevention," *Civil Wars*, 7(1), (2005), 71-97.

³² Daniel C Esty and A. Goldstone, Jack; Gurr, Ted Robert; Harff, Barbara; Levy, Marc; Dabelko, D. Geoffrey; Surko, Pamela T.; Unger, Alan N. "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings" In "Environmental Change & Security Project Report 5", (1999), (Available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c343/feeda994f0355b64c8b6a3e21f6024719249.pdf>).

³³ Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.97, No.1, February (2003), 57-73.

³⁴ Ernesto Verdeja, "Predicting Genocide and Mass Atrocities," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, Vol. 9, No.3, (2016), 13-32.

moreover argue that “*the early warning of protracted political violence need firm empirical footing in dynamic indicators of the political processes leading to political crisis.*”³⁵ The wide spreading and general acceptance of these studies and subsequent developed methods in prevention of mass atrocities is moreover underlined by the development of the UN Framework for the Analysis of Atrocity Crimes. This framework is built up upon risk factors and subsequent indicators, published in 2014 by the UN as an analytical tool serving as the basis for prevention.³⁶ This research supports the development and continuous review of indicators matching empirical findings as contributing to problems of warning response. However, as will be evident from this research, this is not enough. As such, it is essential to enlighten the reader about the popularity and at times domination of this method, as illustrated above.

In alignment with the views presented above, Schmeidl and Jenkins (1998) argue that in order to deal with the gap between warning and response there is the need for development of “*new modelling and data development techniques.*”³⁷ They argue that the development of risk factors that can be identified at an early stage, they cannot only notify politicians about the risk, but must also be used to pressure the actors constituting the threat. Hence the problem of calculating human agency into scientific models, is subsequently solved as it is somehow assumed that this agency can then be affected by decision-makers threatening to intervene in the crisis.³⁸ As such, this focus is placed somewhere in between the two schools of thoughts – it acknowledges the obstacles both at the individual and collective scope of the receiver, however it nonetheless argues that this should be solved through the proper designing and operationalization of the early warning systems. This way of approaching the early warning problem is something Schmeidl (2002, 2016) continues to apply through some later works on early warning systems and the relation between gender and early warning.³⁹⁴⁰

³⁵ Craig J. Jenkins and Bond, Doug, “*Conflict-Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis, and Reconstruction: A Framework for the Early Warning of Political System Vulnerability,*” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No.1, (2001), 3.

³⁶ United Nations, “*UN Framework for the Analysis of Atrocity Crimes*”, (2014).

³⁷ Susanne Schmeidl and Jenkins, Craig J. “*The early warning of humanitarian disasters: Problems in building an early warning system,*” *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 32, No.2, Summer (1998), 471.

³⁸ Supra note 37, 474.

³⁹ Susanne Schmeidl, “*Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology,*” In Cirû Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl (Ed.), “*Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*”, The Red Sea Press, (2002), 69-99.

⁴⁰ Susanne Schmeidl, “*Gender and Early warning*”, Graduate Institute publications, (2016), 51-61, (Available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/genre/shared/Genre_docs/2888_Actes2001/05-schmeidl.pdf).

As for many other works, there is mostly a focus on the structural indicators, while not so explicitly on trigger mechanisms, which will enlighten the decision-makers on the point of a potential crisis escalation. While Schmeidl (2002) does touch upon the need for trigger mechanisms, Clarke (2005) takes an almost opponent stand and argues that “*we don’t need an absolute date, place and time of a future crisis in order to know that the analysis should trigger an immediate policy response.*”⁴¹ His work also contributes to the development of risk factors and models based thereon for the purpose of early warning.⁴² This illustrates an additional discussion, which is to which degree there is a need for setting out triggering mechanism, for example when providing scenarios. While this is not the main focus of this work, triggering mechanisms are also included in the development of the theory – subsequently making these perspectives relevant to mention.

Carment and Garner (1998) argue that risk assessment is the element of forecasting that is relevant for the decision-making aspect, hence this includes probability and estimating consequences.⁴³ Thus it moves research to the next and more analytical level. It has in line with this being argued that the warning is not only forecasting and subsequent description of this, but should also include an action plan in the form of precise recommendations for the decision-makers. Supporting this it has been argued by Harff and Gurr (1998) that “*if researches can forecast more accurately the sites and sequences of crisis escalation, policy makers will be more likely to act early than late.*”⁴⁴ These works thus also indicate the need for specifically set out trigger mechanism, and is moreover in line with Goldman (2011) who talks of different types of intelligence. He describes inadequate intelligence as “*information on an action, event or decision that has already occurred and which requires further action at either the tactical or strategic level.*”⁴⁵ Moreover, the inadequate intelligence will therefore often be very descriptive and focus on conditions that are more or less static.⁴⁶ While actionable intelligence is yet to get its official definition, this can on the other hand be described as intelligence that enables “*responding to intelligence, at the tactical level in the absence of policy*” and will include

⁴¹ *Supra* note 31, 74.

⁴² *Supra* note 31, 71-97.

⁴³ David Carment and Garner, Karen, “*Conflict Prevention and Early Warning: Problems Pitfalls and Avenues for Success,*” Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. 6, No.2, (1998), 103-118.

⁴⁴ Barbara Harff and Gurr, Ted Robert, “*Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies,*” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.35, No.5, (1998), 552.

⁴⁵ Jan Goldman, “*Epistemology of Forecasting in International Relations: Knowledge the difference between Intelligence failure and Warning failure*”, in Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer (Eds.), “*Forecasting, Warning and Responding to Transnational Risks*”, Palgrave Macmillan, 1st Edition, (2011), 42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

in depth analysis or the current situation.⁴⁷ The general intelligence will therefore usually be used for preparation, while the actual response must be based on actionable intelligence.⁴⁸

It was famously noted by General Dallaire that where there is a will, there is a way.⁴⁹ Clarke (2005) however argues that this important phrase could in fact be turned around and as such: “*where there is a way, there is a will.*”⁵⁰ Behind this statement is the underlining of the reasonable basis of the importance of the focus on quality of warnings. Hence the proper intelligence is presented as the basic criteria for building an effective warning-response process. This category of research and its underlying arguments and assumptions are very important to point to, as the research of this paper will identify some different problems with warnings. Despite it being a retrospective analysis, it will albeit be able to point to some important obstacles with regards to these arguments presented.

Lack of Political will and Sensitivity

The arguments presented in this section mainly shares the position that political actors have not noticed or paid the significant attention in cases where they should have prevented crisis. Hence these perspectives generally speaking holds that the conditions for intervening to prevent a crisis is in place and that it is a question of attention, preferences and will of politicians to react in a correct and moral manner.

Ernesto Verdeja (2016) notes, despite the argument that effectively developed indicators can contribute to improvement in early warning, that “*the ultimate challenge concerns whether political leaders will take these warnings seriously.*”⁵¹ Another work that focuses on the lack of action from policy makers is Zartman (2005). He assesses what he describes to be ‘missed opportunities’ to prevent humanitarian crisis in foreign countries. As such, Zartman (2005) argues that the powerful actors in a place to prevent such horrors should have the courage to prevent such crisis, instead of hiding or simply ignoring the warnings.⁵² Evans (2008) additionally speaks of the lack of political will, when intervention to stop mass atrocities is put forward more as a right to intervention than a

⁴⁷ *Supra* note 45, 44.

⁴⁸ *Supra* note 45, 41.

⁴⁹ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, “Request for Protection for Informant, NIR-67” January 11 1994, 1, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB452/docs/doc03.pdf>).

⁵⁰ *Supra* note 31, 71-97, 81.

⁵¹ *Supra* note 34, 28.

⁵² Ira William Zartman, “*Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse*,” Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1st Edition, (2005).

duty. From this stand, she argues that the R2P will switch this condition to a responsibility to intervene and consequently be a solution.⁵³ Hence this underlines a firm belief that a lack of political will is the main problem in prevention of mass atrocities.

Another aspect of warning and response related to this is that of the CNN effect, which is examined by Piers Robinson (2003) and deals with how the medias portrayal of crisis affect decision makers to intervene. It is argued that some crisis interventions have been caused partly by this effect, that cases such as Rwanda contrarily suffered from the opposite effect, which is a lack of media coverage in a way that would trigger an intervention.⁵⁴ Schmeidl and Jenkins (1998) argue along other scholars that the CNN effect is also what sometimes causes the lack of political action.⁵⁵ These arguments are also some that tend to be case specific, that is, depending on the given situation and the type of crisis. This is a common argument put forward by scholars, especially with regards to genocide - perspectives that the reader will be enlightened more about in the presentation of the different arguments with respect to the Rwandan genocide in a later section. This section has thus illustrated the general view on warning-response both in general and with respect to genocide, which is exactly what this research aims at critically exploring. Hence it is very much relevant for the reader of this research to keep these perspectives in mind, especially during the discussion of the results from this work.

Exploring Components of Political will

In 1978 Richard K. Betts argued that the most common problem when failing to prevent is political decision-makers' wrong processing of knowledge due to psychological features rather than the analyst of the actual warning providing wrong or inadequate intelligence.⁵⁶ Despite the earlier notion of the Revisionist school as being the most dominant voice in academia, newer works have also focused to a large degree on unpacking the concept of political will. This focus on lack of political will as something to explore with the aim of countering the problem has David Hyheim (2009) amongst other scholars worked on. He focused on how the processes is affected by different factors

⁵³ Gareth Evans, *"The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All,"* The Brookings Institution Press, 1st Edition, (2008), 31-54.

⁵⁴ Piers Robinson, *"The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention,"* Routledge, 1st Edition, (2002), 1, 93.

⁵⁵ *Supra* note 37, 472.

⁵⁶ Richard K. Betts, *"Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable in World Politics,"* World Politics, Vol. 31, No.1, (1978), 61-69.

both at the individual, organizational and political level.⁵⁷ This approach of unpacking what others have argued to be a simple question of will, is in line with other works identified. Meyer et al. (2010) presents a similar research focus in the field which deals with the problem of a lack of in depth analysis of the cognitive and political processes that a warning undergoes.⁵⁸ This suggests that warning can fail at five different stages, which are respectively: reception, attention, acceptance, prioritization and decision to mobilize.⁵⁹ It is furthermore argued that the best explanation for warning-response failure lies within the scope of the communicative and interactive processes between the producer of the warning and the decision-maker. The authors do not argue that policy makers do not care, in fact they state that it is not only about caring about a given crisis. It is namely a relative question, which is: how much do we care about this in relation to other things on the political agenda right now?⁶⁰ Consequently, warning is seen as a persuasive discourse, which should be analysed accordingly. It is noted that *“credible forecasts as well as accurate forecasting models are important to good warning, but scientific credibility and accuracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for making decision makers pay attention to warnings.”*⁶¹ It is subsequently argued that an important aspect of evaluating warning-response is by looking at the political spectrum at the time of the warning and asking, *“who knew what and when and under what circumstances.”*⁶²

Evident from the arguments presented above one finds that the important analytical aspect of answering questions within this field of research, revolves around the concept of political will and thus discovering underlying factors and as such comprehend which dynamics that constitute the phenomenon.⁶³ This process, it is argued by Meyer et al. (2010), will enable an examination of which conditions lead to the *“formation or prioritization of interest relating to the prevention of violent conflict among relevant actors.”*⁶⁴ The answers to solving the warning response gap, is thus mainly to be found within the field of social psychology and political communication.⁶⁵ Hence while still agreeing with the critics of the decision-makers that problems arise at the political level, this is arguably a more constructive way of addressing political processes, whether collective or individual,

⁵⁷ *Supra* note 30, 13, 81.

⁵⁸ *Supra* note 22, 564.

⁵⁹ *Supra* note 22, 567.

⁶⁰ *Supra* note 22, 561.

⁶¹ *Supra* note 22, 557.

⁶² *Supra* note 22, 564.

⁶³ Lawrence Wocher, *“Deconstructing ‘Political Will’: Explaining the Failure to Prevent Deadly Conflict and Mass Atrocities,”* Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol.12 Spring, (2001), 181-206.

⁶⁴ *Supra* note 22, 561.

⁶⁵ *Supra* note 22, 566.

which serve as obstacles to effective warning response processes. This newer research can also be seen as an attempt to identify the several aspects of this complexity and not just choosing one problem to blame for failures which might have been affected at different levels of the process. These are thus very remarkable perspectives and based on the arguments of this research, they hold a lot of potential in terms of improving warning-response at different levels. Examining the arguments provided by other scholars, furthermore to a large degree inspired this research - henceforward providing analysis exactly by unpacking the presented explanations.

Structural, Tactical and Operational Perspectives

Other scholars have pointed to more specific aspects of the political scope both as the problems but also when looking for a solution to the challenges of warning-response processes. Omand (2011) argues that what is really important is what he calls strategic notice. What matters here is that decision makers are provided with a broader picture of issues and ongoing events that shape the global agenda and therefore an indicator for which direction decision makers will be going and paying attention. He argues that with this strategic notice, both the intelligence analysts and decision makers will be more able to have an insight into their own biases.⁶⁶ In alignment with this one finds Annika Björkdahl's (2000) argues that what will lead to better capacity of early warning and response systems is the inclusion of tools and strategies integrated in policies with the prevention as the main goal.⁶⁷ Hence she focuses on knowledge and awareness of surrounding conflicts and dynamics as providing clear guidance for politicians in taking preventative action.⁶⁸

Touching upon another structural aspect one finds the recommendation made by Austin (2004). He argues that in order to enable a bridge between warning and response the two areas, that is the warning mechanism and the response mechanism should be integrated. This should moreover require that the warning mechanisms are created around and according to the specific prevention mechanism.⁶⁹ This view is furthermore supported by Matveeva (2006) who has focused on studying the relationship

⁶⁶ *Supra* note 18, 30.

⁶⁷ Annika Björkdahl, "Developing a Toolbox for Conflict Prevention. In Preventing Violent Conflict. The Search for Political Will, Strategies and Effective Tools," SIPRI, (2000), (Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRI00PVC.pdf>).

⁶⁸ *Supra* note 67, 18.

⁶⁹ Alexander Austin, "Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?" In "Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation," Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Transformation, (2004), 14, (Available at: https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/austin_handbook.pdf).

between the civil society organizations working with early warning and their relations to governmental and international bodies capable of responding to a potential risk.⁷⁰

Additionally, one finds that scholars have also presented more operational perspectives discussing capacity of the main actors in the field has also been presented by scholars. Adelman (1998) argues that the main problem with early warning might be the positioning of the observer, which is that of for example UN personnel or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) that are trying to observe an ethnic conflict and subsequently attempt to develop an account of what is going on and moreover what is going to happen.⁷¹ He thus points to what would, within the field of anthropology, be accounted for as being the problem of the emic perspective of the observer.⁷² Feil (1998) has also underlined that if the international community has to be involved in the operational aspect of prevention a crisis, they will subsequently have to develop better intelligence capabilities. Specifying this he focuses on the scope that the different actors covered – the international community, government military, private organization etc. - must be better defined.⁷³

These are interesting points also in terms of looking at current structural and operational capabilities both of the individual government but also within international organizations dealing with crisis prevention. These two latter perspectives on more structural and operational aspects belong to the rarer discussions in the field. This research will support the development of such research, as it focuses around the very practical aspects and moreover determining the capacity under the given conditions and circumstances set out as the operational framework.

Genocide, Intelligence and Intent

Relevant for this specific study concerning warning response with respect to genocide, Nelson (2016) has argued that for genocide there is a greater need for letting the number of deaths count and not the establishment of an intent. Enabling this discussion, she sets out the unavoidable fact that

⁷⁰ *Supra* note 23, 12.

⁷¹ Howard Adelman, *"Difficulties in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management,"* In Klaas van Walraven (Ed.) *"Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Opportunities,"* Kluwer Law International, 1st Edition, (1998), 60.

⁷² Harvey Russell Bernard, *"Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches,"* AltaMira Press, 5th Edition, (2011), 25.

⁷³ Scott R. Feil, *"Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda,"* Carnegie Corporation of New York, (1998), (Available at: https://www.carnegie.org/media/filer_public/02/45/0245add3-b6aa-4a08-b9fc-6eb91f4e2975/ccny_report_1998_genocide.pdf).

“under international law, proving the intent to destroy a people in whole or in part is what matters”.⁷⁴ Bećirević (2010) subsequently notes that this role of intent in the crime of genocide, is what is distinct from other cases of mass violence and consequently what makes it so special.⁷⁵ Moreover, she points out that from historical perspectives the proof of intent is used to establish retrospectively if a genocide has occurred, the same goes for the legal aspect of convicting individuals guilty of the crime.⁷⁶

Summing these two insights up, it all comes down to the relevance of identifying the intent to commit genocide through the usage of verbal intelligence, which has however proved to be not as straightforward as the above presented might indicate. As argued by Goldsmith (2010) *“in terms of preventing further atrocities and stopping genocide, proving the perpetrator’s state of mind is a massive problem”*.⁷⁷ Elaborating on this she underlines that this problem is in fact something that the perpetrator is aware of and that they will therefore be very precautionary with expressing specific intent or something that could be interpreted as such.⁷⁸

Goldman (2011) argues that the most important form of intelligence is verbal intelligence which gets you *“inside the mind of your adversary”*.⁷⁹ This concept applied is set out by Historian David Kahn who writes that *“verbal intelligence deals with intentions”* and consequently enables an insight in both *“a material and a psychological component”* of the threat.⁸⁰ This is in contrast to what he calls physical intelligence. Physical intelligence is mainly derived from the tangible things and not from words.⁸¹ Hence it is intelligence that can be obtained either from observation, technology or other related methods. The two major components for analysis that can be derived from verbal intelligence is capabilities and intentions. In this theoretical context, intent is defined as the *“adversary’s purpose, plan, commitment or design for action, as possibly exhibited by a leader, decision-maker, nation or a nation’s foreign policy.”*⁸² Capabilities is defined as *“what your enemy possesses”* and thus in what way they are capable of utilizing those resources.⁸³ By identifying this, one can get access to an

⁷⁴ Diane M. Nelson, *“Bonesetting: The Algebra of Genocide”*, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.18, No.2-3, (2016), 172.

⁷⁵ Edina Bećirević, *“The Issue of Genocidal Intent and Denial of Genocide: A Case Study of Bosnia and Herzegovina”*, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 24, No.4, (2010), 480.

⁷⁶ *Supra* note 75, 482.

⁷⁷ Kathrine Goldsmith, *“The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and its effects on the preventions and punishment of the crime of genocide: Toward a knowledge-based approach”*, Genocide studies and prevention: An International Journal, Vol.5, Issue 3(3), (2010), 242.

⁷⁸ *Supra* note 77, 242.

⁷⁹ *Supra* note 45 36.

⁸⁰ *Supra* note, 35.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Supra* note 45, 36.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

important aspect of the threat, which is how likely it is the event will occur, that is, in terms of ability by the actors posing the threat. This would likely cover the different means such as political, technical, military or other means.⁸⁴ It is important to include these insights under this section as they become noteworthy theoretical considerations to keep in mind for the discussion in this work. It is so, as it pictures the comprehensive and challenging work demanded by the current international law concerning genocide.

Chapter II: Research Approach

This chapter presents the selection of case studies on the Rwandan genocide in 1994 selected and relevant for this research. It furthermore assesses the development of the approach chosen for this research, the research design and subsequent the selection and assessment of the case. Issues and thoughts considered for ensuring reliability and validity will subsequently be touched upon shortly.

Reasoning Approach

The approach to this research is abductive reasoning as this method seeks an explanation for a phenomenon, which has been observed. In this case it is the failure to prevent genocide. As such, a problem is observed and an explanation is subsequently identified through a theoretical framework. The starting point for this approach is current theory and explanations for the phenomenon. The abducted knowledge consequently enables a new possible explaining to be developed throughout the analysis and discussion.⁸⁵ One thus finds that this approach can be utilized to challenge existing theory and therefore existing interpretations. This is highly relevant for the research question(s) of this research, which does exactly question existing interpretations. The research is moreover inspired by the method of structured focused comparison, which was designed in order to enable the study of experience gained from the past and comparison of studies.⁸⁶ Exaggerated by this method, the research questions has thus been developed in a manner that enable the study of similar cases and

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Peter A. Flach and C. Kakas, Antonis, *“Abduction and Inductive: Essays on the Relations and Integration,”* Kluwer Academic Publications, (2000), ix.

⁸⁶ Alexander L. George and Bennett, Andrew *“Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences”*, MIT Press, (2005), 67.

additionally the comparison of results. Relevant for this research is moreover that “*one can generalize from unique cases by treating them as members of a class or type of phenomenon.*”⁸⁷ This is why this specific case can be used to illustrate general obstacles within the theme and scope of warning-response of genocide. The research design applied to this case can consequently be used on multiple but similar case studies of like character. These case studies should have a number characteristics in common - the occurrence of the crime of genocide, the lack of prevention in a timely manner, and lastly scholars arguing that it was the lack of political will to prevent that allowed it to happen. The research questions have henceforward been designed in a manner, that enable similar studies of other cases and hence a comparison of cases and possibility of appliance of the theoretical findings to additional instances.

Selection of case study: Genocide in Rwanda, 1994

Enabling the Research Objectives

George and Bennett (2005) argues that “*the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes.*”⁸⁸ It is on the basis of this that the case study of the Rwandan genocide has been chosen, as also implicit in the research question due to the focus on examining the popular view on the matter. Hence, it can be contained that the best way of examining the criticism of the international community not preventing genocide, is by the challenging scholars discussing the case most often put forward as the most oblivious case of lack of political will. As already mentioned - this furthermore provides better chances of applying the results to other cases and the field in general as the possible development of alternative explanations presumably qualifies in other cases that have been criticized in similar manners. This follows the logic that a case study should not be chosen on the basis that it is just interesting but “*should employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation*”.⁸⁹ The relevance of the chosen case will now, on the basis of this, be illustrated below.

⁸⁷ *Supra* note 86, 113.

⁸⁸ *Supra* note 86, 83.

⁸⁹ *Supra* note 86, 69.

The Popular View

The genocide in Rwanda and the lack of prevention from the international community has been discussed a lot since its occurrence. Different perspectives of what went wrong have been developed, but one still remains as the dominant history. The first dominant interpretation that scholars tend to provide generally argues for both systematic and intentional disregards and is as follows. Samantha Power (2002) assesses the genocide in Rwanda and how the international community failed to prevent it. In her famous and popular investigative account "*A Problem from Hell*" she argues that the US and the UN continuously ignored the warnings and subsequently refused to take any action that could contribute to the prevention or halting of the slaughter in Rwanda.⁹⁰ As such, her main argument is that the US lacked political will to prevent the slaughter in foreign countries.⁹¹ However, this book has self-evidently not solely contributed to the general discourse of the correct explanation of the slaughter in 1994. Linda Melvern (2000) similarly argues in "*A people Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*" that the international community and especially the UNSC did not have the will to put the genocide on the agenda. As such, she bases her argument on the assumption that this prevention was highly possible and notes explicitly that they "*could have prevented what was happening but chose not to do so.*"⁹² These arguments have also been supported by Cameron (2013), White (2015) and Carlsson (2005) the latter focusing on the unwillingness to provide a proper mandate for the UN mission.^{93 94 95} These views, which are shared by other academics as well, tend to portray the situation in a simple manner, which contains that warnings were there and that preventative action could and should therefore have been taken. The former Secretary-General of the UN (1992-1996) Boutros Boutros-Ghali is also amongst the authors who have criticised the UN and especially the US for inaction with respect to the Rwandan genocide, subsequently supporting the view that they did in fact know what was happening.⁹⁶ In an assessment of the relevant intelligence, sent out in the period just prior to the genocide, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) (2014) provides the same interpretation. The focus in this

⁹⁰ *Supra* note 17, 335.

⁹¹ *Supra* note 17, 504.

⁹² Linda Melvern, "*A people Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*", Zed Books, 1st Edition, (2000), 6.

⁹³ Dean J. White, "*The Ignorant Bystander?: Britain and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994*" Manchester University Press, (2005), 34.

⁹⁴ Cameron Hazel, "*Britain's Hidden Role in Rwandan State Violence*", Routledge, 1st Edition, (2013).

⁹⁵ Ingvar Carlsson, "*The UN Inadequacies*", Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol.3, Issue 4(1), September (2005), 837.

⁹⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "*Unvanquished, A United Nations-United States Saga*", I.B. Tauris, (1999), 134, 138, 141.

assessment is mainly on the information that could lead to the interpretation of the risk of a genocide, which subsequently frames the presentation of the data in a way that would argue that the intelligence constituting a risk was indeed in place.⁹⁷ A similar study has been made by William Ferroggiaro (2004), who covers warnings set out by different agencies such as embassies, (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) UNAMIR, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies. Assessing the reports, he concludes “*that the Clinton Administration decided against intervention at any level was not for lack of knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda.*”⁹⁸ In one of the newest and most comprehensive works on the topic, the book called “*Rwandan Genocide: The Essential Reference Guide*” by Alexis Herr (2018) argues that the international community chose inaction despite the fact that they knew what was going on.⁹⁹ She contends that the standby of the international community happened “*despite specific information and intelligence from sources on the ground, but leading up to and during the genocide.*”¹⁰⁰ She moreover argues that exactly the lack of applying the word genocide, only proves that they did not want to get involved as they knew this would demand a reaction.¹⁰¹ Other works focus mostly on the politics of the governments that should have acted or within the UN organization.^{102 103 104} Hence a tendency that can additionally be seen is that studies do not exclusively focus on the knowledge available at the time. Additionally, in the cases where they do, they all provide the same interpretation which is arguing for a really good quality of the data. The works containing this view hence follows the general discourse on the matter. Some of the scholars mentioned in this section, will also be the ones drawn upon when selecting the data for the analysis, as the aim is to re-examine reports that have been presented from this argumentative perspective that the above-mentioned scholars hold.

⁹⁷ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “*Warnings of Catastrophe: Part II*”, 1, (Available on: <https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda/turning-points/warnings-of-catastrophe-part-ii>).

⁹⁸ William Ferroggiaro, “*The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the US Response*”, The National Security Archive, 1, (2004), (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/>).

⁹⁹ Alexis Herr, “*Rwandan Genocide: The Essential Reference Guide*”, ABC-CLIO, 1st Edition, (2018), xiv.

¹⁰⁰ *Supra* note 99, Loc 6933.

¹⁰¹ *Supra* note 99, Loc 6956.

¹⁰² *Supra* note 95, 837- 846.

¹⁰³ Samuel Totten, “*The Intervention and Prevention of Genocide: Sisyphean or Doable?*”, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.6, No.2, June (2004), 229–247.

¹⁰⁴ *Supra* note 94.

Alternative Accounts

While the above presented view constitutes the main part of research and moreover the most commonly accepted view on the matter, other explanations can also be identified. These deals with both cognitive, operational and organizational limitations argued to exist at that time. Howard Adelman (1998) argues that the politicians were possibly not fully aware that a genocide was about to happen in Rwanda, because of the lack of existing effective early warning systems at the time.¹⁰⁵ It is thus argued that the politicians cannot be blamed for their lack of action if the conditions for taking such decisions were not in place. Another argument in alignment with this is that it was not a problem of lack of information available but rather that the information was not put together and analysed correctly – this being caused by of staff properly organized and equipped for the purpose both with respect to the UN and other NGO's on the ground, following Adelman and Suhrke (1996).¹⁰⁶ Underlying this argument is thus the idea that if done better, this could have enabled a response. Adelman and Suhrke (1996) also points to the central problem with respect to the lack of proper warning and response in the Rwanda that warnings were sent out already in 1990, but that no one used them to predict that a genocide was coming. They moreover note that the tensions that started to intensify in the following three years were not sufficiently monitored. This is due to a lack of capacity of organization such as the UN to collect such data and conduct proper analysis. This led to a lack of significance derived to the intelligence sent out in the initial part of the genocide, which resulted in what he notes to be intelligence failures happening within the government system of the US.¹⁰⁷ This is supported by White (2015) that points to the misunderstanding of the conflict as a civil war, which partly led to the failure.¹⁰⁸ A different approach has also been offered by Barnett (2003) who focuses more on the ethical and moral aspect of preventing genocide, and hence argues that despite the fact that it was wrong, the UN did do what they thought was the right thing at the time, in

¹⁰⁵ *Supra* note 71, 56.

¹⁰⁶ Howard Adelman and Suhrke, Astri, "*Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management*," In David Millwood (ed.) "*The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*," DANIDA, (1996), 18, 19, (Available at: <http://search.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/50189764.pdf>).

¹⁰⁷ *Supra* note 106, 11.

¹⁰⁸ *Supra* note 93, 38.

the light of the global agenda and international organization in general. Related to this, he poses the question if morality is something that can be the basis for building international institutions.¹⁰⁹

Dr. Alan Kuperman (1998) does amongst few challenge the most popular view that the lack of prevention of the Rwandan genocide was solely a lack of political will. In his book “*The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*”, he argues that it is structural and operational limitations of interventions in a genocide or similar situations that made it difficult to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Kuperman thus states that that even if the UN and US would have recognized it as a genocide, the organization of troops to be sent in has in practical limitations in terms of timing. He subsequently argues that due to the extensive amounts of killing, it could not have been prevented it in a timely manner even if the willingness was present.¹¹⁰ As such, one finds that the problem is the nature of the extend of the organization and effectiveness of the killers, as well as the limitations of the military organization with regards to quick organization and deployment. Dr. George H. Stanton (2004) on the other hand argues that cognitive dissonance was one of the main reasons why the US did not intervene in the genocide. This cognitive dissonance is arguably a result of the discourse effectuated after the failure of the intervention in Somalia – the discourse that US did not want to and should not get involved in foreign civil wars.¹¹¹ This is an argument that has also been used by other scholars, amongst others Meyer and De Franco (2011).¹¹²

It is interesting to note that while in general literature on warning-response there seem to be a majority of work supporting the important of the warnings themselves (indicators, certainty etc.) while when taking one of the most prominent case in terms of criticizing the failure to prevent, the most literature to be found is one the political aspect of the process. Most of the work does moreover not apply neutral examination of the actual quality of the warnings. In fact, only a few studies provide critical examination of the quality of the warnings. In the few that can be identified there is a tendency that this is then situated within work with different main focus as for example Piiparinen (2006) who focuses on the institutional and organizational aspects of the warning process from Rwanda to the UN, but mostly on how these were processed and not so much how they were produced and what the

¹⁰⁹ Michael Barnett, “*Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*,” Cornell University Press, (2003).

¹¹⁰ Alan J. Kuperman, “*The limits of humanitarian intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*”, Brookings Institution Press, (2001), 85, 86, 87.

¹¹¹ Gregory H. Stanton, “*Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?*” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.6, No.2, (2004), 218, 220.

¹¹² *Supra* note 18, 248.

capacity of the warnings were.¹¹³ Harff (1993) does also amongst few point to the problem of a lack of data that can serve as a basis for precise predictions.¹¹⁴

The relevance for choosing this case study can thus be found in the current literature in academia or more precisely in the lack thereof. What is lacking are studies with in-depth analysis that focuses specifically on the material containing early warning available at the time. There is thus a tendency that the quality and subsequent potential is taken for granted. It is important, as mentioned in the introduction, not to take a popular argument for granted especially within a scope like this where the problem of effective genocide prevention still prevails today. This will be further underlined and supported, when the strategy for collecting data for this study is set out later in this chapter.

Theoretical Framework

The Warning-Response loop

The theoretical framework shaping the analysis will be provided from existing literature and will be applied in order to situate the analysis both within current theory, but also for the purpose of identifying the specific scope of warning-response examined.¹¹⁵ As the following reads: *“to transform specific explanations into general theoretical terms, the researcher's theoretical framework must be broad enough to capture the major elements of the historical context.”*¹¹⁶ This has been attempted, and the models applied have been drawn on the criteria of being relevant to the specific case study and research questions. The scope for this research and the analytical perspective chosen will be situated within the warning-response-loop as presented by Meyer and De Franco (2011) which sets out four categories in which four challenges for prevention are presented. These four are respectively: Forecasting, Communication, Preventative action and Learning as seen in Figure 1. Each of these four have their own challenges with respect to enabling an effective warning-response process. For forecasting, the obstacles often deal with accuracy, specificity and certainty,

¹¹³ *Supra* note 3, 334-349.

¹¹⁴ Barbara Harff, *“An Early Warning System is Needed,”* Institute for the Study of Genocide, Newsletter, Fall, 11, (1993), 4.

¹¹⁵ Robert K. Yin, *“Case Study Research: Designs and Methods,”* London Sage Publications, 5th Edition, (2013), 39.

¹¹⁶ *Supra* note 86, 92.

while for preventative action the problem can be taking the actions that fulfils the criteria of both feasibility, proportionality and justice. For communication, there can be challenges related to persuasiveness, truth and mutual respect between the actors. Finally, the learning scope of warning-response is the area that deals with spotting weak signals, how one receives information and prudent prioritization.¹¹⁷

Figure 1: “The Warning-response-loop: Four Challenges for Prevention”
by De Franco and Meyer (2011)¹



The focus in this research will be situated mainly within the scope of forecasting and subsequently touching upon challenges of preventative action. This will enable an examination of the three challenges of forecasting and an analysis of how these consequently affect the options for successful preventative action. This model has been chosen because it has been developed on the basis of theoretical and practical inputs from several scholars, hence allows the positioning of this research design within already established models and theory. Furthermore, it enables the zooming in specifically on the three challenges but still having a theoretical basis for drawing connections to other aspects of warning-response. It can then be used as a framework for evaluation of the more specific aspects, which might provide a more accessible approach to evaluation and analysis of

¹¹⁷ *Supra* note 18, 7.

warning-response processes. Hence the narrow focus and subsequent findings can and will also be used to provide indirect insights in the other aspects of the loop and their interaction.

In the same work Meyer and De Franco (2011) moreover conclude that if these three challenges are not dealt with, it will decrease the likelihood of a successful warning-response process.¹¹⁸ The findings drawn from this study will therefore also be able to say something about the chance that a process alike will be successful, if the data is of the same quality as the data assessed in this research.

Definitions of Analytical Importance

As can be identified in the warning-response loop, the warning-response covers both the forecasting aspect, hence data collection and subsequent analysis and the response aspect where preventative action is taken in response to the warning. Here it should be noted that the gap referred to when mentioning the warning-response gap, is the gap between the warning and the response that should follow, hence it is a lack of connection between the two that lead to challenges in the process as a whole.

Forecasting is often derived from a range of factors and indicators identified for that purpose, and moreover often touch upon the near future, while prediction means being able to tell that something is happening in advance of the event.¹¹⁹ Scenario building on the other hand, offers a different account of what is possibly going to happen, and does not need to rely on past or recent trends for establishing these. Hence it has less limitations than the two priors as it is based on imagination.¹²⁰ Prevention covers the identification and elimination of the elements that can cause the potential harm while mitigation aims at minimizing the harmful outcome of something that is not preventable.¹²¹ For the purpose of this research, the definitions used for risk, threat and harm will be understood as follows. Risk is defined as “*a composite measure of the probability and (negative) consequences of a given phenomenon*”¹²² and the related concept of a threat is subsequently defined as “*the intentions and*

¹¹⁸ *Supra* note 18, 243.

¹¹⁹ Fabian Wagner, “*Modelling Transnational Environmental Risks: Scenarios for Decision Support*”, in Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer (Eds.), “*Forecasting, Warning and Responding to Transnational Risks*”, Palgrave Macmillan, 1st Edition, (2011), 65, 68.

¹²⁰ *Supra* note 119, 69.

¹²¹ *Supra* note 18, 2.

¹²² *Supra* note 18, 6.

capabilities of a particular source to inflict harm”¹²³. Finally, harm is defined as follows: “*The negative consequence when a risk materializes from a given user’s perspective.*”¹²⁴

Another concept that also has conceptual importance for the purpose of this research is that of early warning. This concept is finally defined as “*the communication of information on a crisis area, analysis of that information, and development of potential, timely, strategic response options to the crisis.*”¹²⁵ These above described concepts are all some that are applied throughout this work, and therefore it is arguably important to include this section, for the reader to capture and understand the wording correctly.

Research Design

Development of Variables in Social Science

For the operationalization of the analysis of the documents with respect to the warning process, the three concepts of specificity, certainty, and accuracy will now be defined, and a table displaying the operationalization of the three measurements will moreover be presented. Within social science a careful operationalization of variables becomes crucial for the purpose of measurement and additionally the option for applying them in other research contexts. For this specific research, the operationalization of the three above presented variables should depend on the identification of when “*variation in one thing causes a variation in another.*”¹²⁶ The independent variables should thus be understood as something that in their presence increase the degree of the dependent variable. The dependent variables, which are the three challenges of certainty, accuracy and specificity derived from the area of forecasting from Figure 1 previously presented. These have then been operationalized, which consequently sets out the independent variables. The independent variables are the ones that make the identification of the dependent factor possible in the data to be assessed, as they are adjusted to enable a textual analysis of the data. The variables has been operationalized by looking for language that can in its absence or presence either decrease or increase

¹²³ *Supra* note 18, 6, 7.

¹²⁴ *Supra* note 18, 7.

¹²⁵ *Supra* note 71, 52.

¹²⁶ *Supra* note 72, 23.

the degree of which the material has managed to deal with the three challenges of forecasting. As such, if words are used in a way where it broadens the ability of the receiver to grasp the right interpretation of the information in this given context, then it shows that the challenge of specificity was a problem. The same goes for certainty and accuracy, which can also be measured in the same manner, by searching for usage of wording applied in the way described in the column to the right.

Operationalization of Challenges in Warning-Response Processes

The table beneath named “Figure 2: Operationalization of Challenges in Warning-Response Processes” contains the operationalization of the above described theory. To the left one finds the three dependent variables of certainty, accuracy and specificity. In the column to the right the independent variables developed on the basis of these three variables are set out. If the independent variable can be identified in the data, there is an increase in the quality with respect to the matching variable.

The table was moreover created based on certain definitions and backgrounds. These will now be set out. Firstly, specificity is defined as the degree of something being clear or exact.¹²⁷ With respect to assessing the degree of specificity one thus speaks of the narrowness of the information. If the intelligence provided is very board it is therefore likely that the warning-response process will fail. Secondly, certainty is normally described as something that cannot be doubted or is completely confident.¹²⁸ This means that the inclusion of language in intelligence and warning reports that is interpreted as doubtful or uncertain, will challenge an effective warning-response process. Lastly, a common definition of accuracy and therefore the one applied for this study: “*the fact of being exact or correct*”.¹²⁹ Hence it should be what matches the reality. This means that the more accurate the intelligence, the more likely it will be to contribute to an effective warning response process. Whilst one can argue that this is sort of a controversial demand, as one would argue that accuracy is exactly what one cannot know of – me as the analyst not being present in the situation or before the scenario has actually played out - it still be evaluated, despite it being from this awkward position. The focus

¹²⁷ Cambridge Dictionary, Accessed online, 14 May 2019, (Available at: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/specificity>)

¹²⁸ Cambridge Dictionary, Accessed online, 14 May 2019, (Available at: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/certainty>).

¹²⁹ Cambridge Dictionary, Accessed online, 14 May 2019, (Available at: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/accuracy>).

will as a result be on the individual reports. As one will encounter later this awkward position might apply to all three challenges as one will encounter later when it will be elaborated on when discussing the limitations of the study.

Figure 2: Operationalization of Challenges in Warning-Reponses Processes

Dependent variable	Independent variable
Certainty	1. <i>Exclusion of words indicating uncertainty</i>
	2. <i>Description of clear cause-and-effect relationship/reasoning, including triggering mechanisms</i>
	3. <i>Exclusion of reservations</i>
	4. <i>Words or phrases expressing confidence</i>
Accuracy	5. <i>Comprehensive information and analysis providing a substantial picture of the situation on the ground</i>
	6. <i>A clear correspondence within the information in the single report</i>
	7. <i>Knowledge obtained from people present in the environment, which the information concerns</i>
Specificity	8. <i>Words or accounts that include a description of their exact meaning in the given context</i>
	9. <i>Exclusion of words that serve solely to broaden the interpretative scope</i>
	10. <i>Words carefully used in a way that enables the receiver to understand the relative value, degree or meaning of the concepts in the given context</i>

Collection of data

The focus in this work is on the documents containing warning and information prior to the genocide. This time scope is chosen as it enables a discussion of early warning and thus prevention and consequently not the halting and intervening in an already happening genocide. The titles, date and sender/author of the 5 documents subject to analysis can be seen in Figure 3. Throughout this work, the documents will be referred to by the letter that they have been given in the column to the left. Moreover, report C will sometimes be referred to as ‘The Genocide Fax’.

Figure 3: Overview of data		
	Official title of document	Date and organization
A	Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali’s message	October 14, 1990
		Embassy of France, Rwanda
B	INR/AA’S AFRICAN TRENDS – 9/18/92 (NO.19)	September 18, 1992
		US Department of State, Rwanda
C	Request for Protection for Informant, NIR-67	January 11, 1994
		UNAMIR, Kigali
D	The Military and the Transition to Peace	February 17, 1994
		US Embassy in Kigali
E	Telex #24, From MINAFET to DELBELONU	February 25, 1994
		Belgium Foreign Ministry

The material that will be assessed in the analysis, has been collected through the examination and review of already existing works within the field. The five reports thus have been selected as scholars have used them to argue that the good warnings were in place prior to the Rwanda genocide and consequently making it a question of political will. As this research aims at challenging this view through in-depth examination of the warnings, the ideal approach is to draw on exact arguments and sources from these studies, when choosing the data that should be examined. This approach to data collection furthermore increases the validity of this research, as it will be based on the same data as the very argument that it will potentially criticize or extend. Hence it is additionally inherently secured that the data is not selected in a biased manner and this is subsequently an attempt to counter-act my own cognitive dissonance as a researcher.

Utilizing this approach for the collection of data, it should be noted that it is not just the studies presented here in this work that tend to rely on these source - these are sources that can be identified in the majority of the scholarly work supporting this view. Moreover, they tend to offer the similar and very limited interpretation of them and consequently come up with the same conclusion. To exemplify this, some of these works and their arguments are presented here. More specific examples of statements about the quality of the specific reports, will be given as they are more elaborately presented in the initial part of each of their main section in the analysis.

The first study that has been drawn on was conducted by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (2014) on *"Warnings of Catastrophe"*, which is one out a pile of briefing books on the genocide in Rwanda. This focuses specifically as the title indicates, on what they argue to be the obvious warnings of genocide.¹³⁰ Another study by William Ferroggiaro (2004) assesses warnings and reports about the genocide along the different actors. It subsequently analyses their role and how they sent out the warnings.¹³¹ Both studies aim at displaying the warnings with respect to Rwanda as obvious and numerous, in terms of an upcoming genocide. The basis for drawing on these two when collecting data is that they, as a few to be identified in the field, aim at examining the warnings available at the time and thus base their main part of the research on material issued prior to the genocide and not information that came to the light after its occurrence. The data is also material that can be identified in famous works criticizing the international community and especially the US for

¹³⁰ *Supra* note 97, 1.

¹³¹ *Supra* note 98, 1.

standing by and watching the genocide “*A problem from Hell*” by Samantha Power who is an example of these works, argues that the reports also drawn upon in this work “*warned explicitly of a possible genocide.*”¹³² This work on the other hand does not include in-depth interpretation of the material based on scientific measures but jumps straight to the conclusion as many other works. Like in Linda Melvern’s (2000) “*A people betrayed: The role of the West in the Rwandan Genocide*” a lot of the conclusions are based not only on this data, but on information and facts that came to the light after the genocide, and as such exclusively knowledge that was available when it erupted.¹³³ It can be argued that these two accounts do not rely much on theoretical insights and reasoning but are more empirically investigative than theoretical. This makes the data they rely on relevant for this analysis, as it possibly enables an alternative analysis than they provide. White (2015) also holds that some of this intelligence was evidence that the genocide was coming and moreover refers to material from the Belgium Embassy as a “*catalogue of evidence.*”¹³⁴ This position with respect to these warnings are also hold by Cameron (2013), Boutros-Ghali (1999) and Herr (2018) amongst others.^{135 136 137} Obviously, these studies do not all focus solely on the five reports that are subject to this analysis but do as already mentioned also focus on additional material. Therefore, the five reports chosen for this analysis have been the ones presented as the most obvious warnings and also the ones referred to most often. Additionally, this will be illustrated in the analysis.

Henceforward the data that this research relies upon, comes from a bigger pile of intelligence sent out at the time, a significant part of it still being classified today. With respect to this “*the critical question, however, is whether the loss of information and simplification jeopardizes the validity and utility of the theory (...)*”¹³⁸ In the light of this, it is important that the reader keeps in mind that the study does not aim at drawing conclusions on the warning process in general, but to challenge the line of interpretation made by scholars. Rather than serving as a sample, hence something that represent the larger population of data, the data assessed should be considered as “*the opportunity to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or principles*”.¹³⁹ This is important to note to

¹³² *Supra* note 17, 338.

¹³³ *Supra* note 92, 256-263.

¹³⁴ *Supra* note 95, 34.

¹³⁵ *Supra* note 94.

¹³⁶ *Supra* note 99.

¹³⁷ *Supra* note 96; 134, 138, 141.

¹³⁸ *Supra* note 86, 114.

¹³⁹ *Supra* note 115, 40.

avoid the misunderstanding that this study should serve to represent a sample of warning intelligence in general, which it should not.

That being said, there might still be reasonable ground to think that this study can provide general findings within the field of warning-response of genocide, as set out in the quote above. Later the discussion on the limitations of this work will furthermore address the approach to data collection critically.

Assessment of data

The approach for the assessment of the data applied for this analysis is qualitative. This approach has been chosen as it provides the opportunity to look at the content of the documents and moreover the value of these in the light of existing arguments about their quality. George and Bennett (2005) have argued that there is a tendency that the analyst assessing the data will automatically interpret the data in favour of the point that one is trying to make.¹⁴⁰ As the reliability is important, it has been assured that another researcher conducting the same research will be able to reach the same results with the given theory.¹⁴¹ This ensures an objective assessment of the data, and moreover the opportunity for a similar study to be carried out for another case of relevance. The documents will be assessed applying the independent variables. This enables a determination of the degree of the dependent variable, subsequently leading to conclusions on how the reports have managed to fulfil these. Moreover, other sources will, as already noted, also be drawn upon to provide a contextual analysis of the three challenges, which serve as the main focus.

Some of the reports included in the sources from which the data has been collected, are not cited directly in the analysis, as they might not have touched upon aspects explicitly relevant for this study. This however does not mean that they have not been assessed to ensure a comprehensive analysis but that they rather only include general information on meetings, formalities or other aspects not directly linked to the warning aspect.

¹⁴⁰ *Supra* note 86, 99.

¹⁴¹ *Supra* note 115, 46.

Chapter III: Case Study - Genocide in Rwanda 1994

This chapter provides the reader with a short introduction to the conflict in the Rwanda both terms of origin but also about the dynamics at the time where the genocide erupted. While further information will be provided throughout the analysis, this will offer a fundamental insight in the conflict.

The roots of the ethnic conflict escalating in 1994 can be drawn back to the Colonial times, where the European powers who ruled the country started to play the two ethnic groups of Hutu and Tutsis out against each other - groups that had till that time co-existed peacefully in Rwanda. Especially the Belgium administration played a significant role in favouring the minority group of the Tutsis and consequently ignoring the majority of the population who belonged to the Hutu ethnicity.¹⁴² Since that time, there has been strong tensions especially from Hutu extremist groups wanting to take back to power claimed to have been taken from them by the Tutsis, especially since the 1950s where Hutu extremist movements were created.¹⁴³

On July 1st 1962 when Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium and became a Hutu dominated country, there was henceforward exercised highly discriminative practices against the Tutsi minority from this time on.¹⁴⁴ As a result of these practices, the following decades forced huge parts of the Tutsi population to flee to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Burundi and Zaire. From this exile, the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) formed a Tutsi political-military organization, and on October 1st 1990 it entered Rwanda to fight its way back to power and started an approximately three-year long civil war.¹⁴⁵ In 1993 UN peacekeeping forces were sent to support the peacekeeping process, initiated as a result of the peace negotiation called the Arusha Accords taking place in Tanzania between the Rwandan government and the RPF. The peace agreement was signed on

¹⁴² Brad S. Long and Mills, Albert J, *"Globalization, postcolonial theory, and organizational analysis: lessons from the Rwanda genocide"*, Critical Perspectives on International Business, Vol.4, Issue 4, (2008), 389-409, 396.

¹⁴³ *Supra* note 99, xvii.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

August 4th, 1993 by the respective parties.¹⁴⁶ The UNAMIR was thus created, and was on the ground from October 1993 with the mandate to support the implementation of the peace agreement.¹⁴⁷

The genocide in Rwanda is commonly argued to have escalated in the beginning of April and having lasted until mid-July the same year.¹⁴⁸ It initiated following the shoot-down of the Rwandan president's airplane on the 6th of April, an event that was claimed by the Hutus to be the work of the Tutsi rebels.¹⁴⁹ Around the time of the genocide, the Hutu population constituted around 85% of the population while the Tutsi comprised solely 14%.¹⁵⁰ Approximately 800.000 people were killed, this being an estimate that is still today not exactly determined.¹⁵¹ The genocide was carried out by the Hutu extremists against the other ethnic group - the Tutsis. Politically moderate Hutus were additionally killed, if not supporting the extremist movement and the genocide in practice.¹⁵² Interestingly however is that the majority of the killings were carried out by civilian Hutus, hence people who normally had no connection to military organizations.¹⁵³

Before this, ethnic massacres had already been taking place.¹⁵⁴ During this UN peacekeeping missions was present, though with a lack of capacity and mandate to prevent the slaughter. Hence the UN refused to send further support until the slaughter had ended and the international community finally recognized it as a genocide and acted accordingly.

¹⁴⁶ "Peace Agreement between the government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front," The United Nations, 4 August 1993, Accessed on 8 May 2018, (Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_930804_PeaceAgreementRwanda-RwandesePatrioticFront.pdf).

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Rwanda (5 Oct)", S/RES/872, 5 October 1993, (Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement>).

¹⁴⁸ *Supra* note 99, xvii.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Supra* note 142, 390.

¹⁵² *Supra* note 142, 390.

¹⁵³ *Supra* note 99, xviv.

¹⁵⁴ *Supra* note 142, 396.

Chapter IV: Analysis

This chapter analyses the quality of the reports that are presented by some scholars as being accurate and obvious warning and thus of good quality with respect to prevention of genocide. The analysis will subsequently form the basis for later discussion of whether the judgement of Rwanda is legitimate. Thus, it should be noted that the aim of the analysis is not to explain the failure or success, but to illustrate how some works promoting one view is interpretation the data in a way that leads to a high degree of simplification of the situation.

Structure of Analysis

Throughout the analysis the reader will be able to see that equal attention is not given to each of the variables for each for the quotes that are subject to analysis. It is so as some independent variables are more relevant for some of the excerpts to analyse than the other. This should not be seen as a selective approach where some relevant subjects for analysis are left out, but simply that there is a logical match between the information/sort of reporting including the language and the variables that are relevant to look at. As the analysis moves along, the variables set out in the methodology chapter will be continuously referred to. This will consequently enable the reader to continuously follow the line of argumentation. Even though it has been attempted to make an analysis strictly structured along the three variables within each section when analysing a document, there are however some links to be drawn and a relationship between the three - that makes this unreasonable to stick to at all times. Therefore, the main points from each document are instead divided up under several smaller headlines, throughout the analysis.

A: Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali's message, (Oct. 14, 1990)

Explicit or Disguised

This first document relevant for the analysis concerns mostly certainty and specificity. This report, which have been portrayed as not only as good but also as a very early warning is the report '*Excerpt from the Defense Attaché in Kigali*' from October 1990 sent by the French ambassador to

Rwanda. Gregory H. Stanton (2009) has argued that the information, contained in this report amongst others, is information that were very early warnings, which means that they were simply ignored.¹⁵⁵ He indirectly argues that this exemplifies what he would call an early warning, and thus presumably a warning of good quality. It is moreover referred to by Herr (2018)¹⁵⁶ and USHMM (2014)¹⁵⁷ amongst others. This is the first document presented by the study of USHMM when illustrating that warnings of the genocide were in place very early. Herr (2018) additionally describes it as a very early indication of the violence that was going to happen in 1994, henceforward the genocide.¹⁵⁸

The first section, which is used significantly by these scholars from the report, reads the following:

*“THE REESTABLISHMENT, EXPLICIT OR DISGUISED, WOULD RESULT IN THE PHYSICAL ELIMINATION OF TUTSIS IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY, 500.000 TO 700.000 PEOPLE, BY THE 7.000.000 HUTUS”*¹⁵⁹

Examining at the independent variables affecting the degree of certainty, this sample includes a clear cause-and-effect relationship as pointed to by independent variable 2 and moreover does this without including words that expresses the uncertainty. It sets out what would be the trigger mechanism of this, which is the reestablishment. This reestablishment referred to here is the Tutsis wanting to take back the political power and land in the northeast that they had lost during the period of ethnic violence back in the 1959. Actually, that was a commonly known fact for many years.¹⁶⁰

Looking closer at the actual wording in this relationship it actually says that it ‘would’ result in these killings and in that sense expresses confidence. According to independent variable 4, words or phrases that express confidence increase the degree of certainty. The fact that the word ‘would’ was used instead of for example ‘could’ or ‘might’ therefore additionally increases the degree of certainty.

¹⁵⁵ *Supra* note 111; 9, 20.

¹⁵⁶ *Supra* note 99, Loc 132.

¹⁵⁷ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *“Warnings of Catastrophe: Part I”*, (2014), Accessed 14 May 2019, (Available on: <https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda/turning-points/warnings-of-catastrophe-part-i>).

¹⁵⁸ *Supra* note 99, Loc 5949.

¹⁵⁹ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, *“Excerpts from the defense Attaché in Kigali’s message, October 24 1990, Assessment of the political situation”*, 1990, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%201%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf>).

¹⁶⁰ United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, *“15th session 11 August 1993”*, 1993, 11, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%203.pdf>).

The variable of specificity however, decreases the quality of the information to utilize for forecasting. The quality of this variable is decreased if words are included solely to broaden the interpretative scope as set out under the independent variable 9. It can be argued that 'explicit' and 'disguised' can be categorized as such words. Even though it might be an attempt to include anything, and subsequently warn that this is something that should really be paid explicit attention to, it is not known for the receiver what such reestablishment could look like in practice - hence a contextual description as set out under independent variable 10 is missing. This means that there is a chance that what might be intended to function as an all-inclusive description ends up at the same time being all-and-nothing-inclusive, as there is no description of what form this might take.

This additionally means that the certainty is decreased as there is no clear cause-and-effect relationship set out and a subsequent trigger mechanism as requested by independent variable 2. There is thus a cause-and-effect relationship, however it is not clear - because it is so unspecific it is of no use. This is a really important point, as it reveals that the quality of the warnings might be different than what they appear as at a first glance.

Coherence is Accuracy

Analysing the variable of accuracy and independent variable 6, one finds that there is no information that is not coherent with the additional information in the report. The information is furthermore likely to be more accurate when it comes directly from a person that is in the environment of which the information concerns at the time of reporting, which is also the case. This is included in independent variable 7 and is fulfilled as it came from the Defense Attaché in Kigali and can therefore be qualified as being information that came directly from people present in the environment which the information concerns.

B: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS (NO. 19), (Sep. 18, 1992)

Genocidal civil war

This section analyses the second document subject to this analysis. This section as a result deals with both certainty, accuracy and specificity. In September 1992, a report named '*INR/AA'S*

AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)’ was drafted on the situation in Rwanda by the US Department of State. USHMM (2014) has argued that this report “*predicted*” that the Hutus “*might be tempted to play the genocide card.*”¹⁶¹ Moreover, it is noted that “*the documents published here provide further reminders of the passivity of an international community scarred by the murders of UN peacekeepers in Somalia in October 1993.*”¹⁶² Hence the study argues that the general failure to prevent the genocide was not caused by a lack of proper warning, but rather the recent failure in Somalia and consequent lack of political will. Furthermore, another example to be provided is Levinger (2016) proves another example as he argues that this report contains structural information about what was going to happen and to top this he calls it “ominous signs” that the US government chose to ignore.¹⁶³

The year is 1992 and at this time, there was a little less than two years to the genocide erupting and the practical circumstances described here concerns the peace settlement and reads as follows:

*“THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, FAILS.”*¹⁶⁴

Both independent variables 1 and 4 are positively managed. These deal with words expressing respectively uncertainty or confidence. Evident as the word ‘will’ is used to express confidence about the possibility being present if the peace talks do not succeed. The use of this word instead of for example ‘may’ or ‘could’, thus increase the degree of certainty.

Referring to point 3, there is additionally no reservations noting that this information or analysis might not be correct. This does, according to the theory, increase the level of certainty of the information. It is noteworthy that it says that the possibility of a civil war will be there, instead of for

¹⁶¹ *Supra* note 97, 1.

¹⁶² *Supra* note 157.

¹⁶³ Matthew Levinger, “*Why the U.S. Government Failed to Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention*,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, Vol.9, Issue 3(6), (2016), 46, 68.

¹⁶⁴ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, “*INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)*”, September 23 (1992), 2, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%202.pdf>).

example weakening it by including ‘will possibly be there’. This means that words only used to indicate uncertainty are excluded and moreover that the word ‘will’ is used to express confidence.

We now turn to look at independent variable 2 that examines the presence of a cause-and-effect relationship. It reads that it is if the peace negotiations go wrong that this will be a possibility. Hence, they create a co-relation between the two, subsequently making it a very likely interpretation that this possibility is not a threat if the peace talks go as planned. This means that despite the fact that independent variable 2 is highly fulfilled resulting in an increase in certainty, there are problems with accuracy analysing this retrospectively.

Important findings can be identified when analysing the variable of accuracy in relation to the high degree of certainty expressed in the sentence. Specifically addressing point 5 and 6, which concern comprehensive information and analysis providing a substantial picture of reality and a clear correspondence between reports and reality. It reads that the possibility of a ‘genocidal civil war’ will be present if the peace negotiations fails. The degree of accuracy is decreased here, as there is no clear correspondence between the report and what the situation was in reality, which is caused by the mismatch in cause-and-effect relationship. An increase in independent variable 5 and subsequently a more extensive analysis might have helped this, as more information could have given a clearer picture of the size of the probability was.

Depending on what, how much?

In the same report is it informed that the success of the peace agreement depends on how much power the respective parties are willing to give up or not achieve as planned. This can be exemplified through two different quotes that are to be found in the report. The direct wording is the following:

(...)” DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW MUCH POWER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS WILLING TO CEDE TO THE RPF AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION PARTIES.”¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ *Supra* note 164, 3.

Firstly, variable 2 is relevant to this quote, as it concerns the cause-and-effect relationships and triggering mechanisms. There is arguably established a cause-and-effect relationship between two factors. It is stated that the peace negotiations will depend on how much power the president is willing to give up. This should in itself increase the level of certainty. Even though it is noted that this is only partly, it still keeps the focus on the political processes and willingness – a failure in this resulting in the failure for peace. As such, the focus on this is also established to be the cure.

With regards to certainty, independent variable 1 and 4 are also very relevant as they concern wording expressing confidence or uncertainty. Even though the word ‘depends’ in itself is not a word that express certainty, it is in this case, as it stands alone and is not accompanied by additional wording crated doubt resulting in for example ‘could depend on’ or ‘possibly depend on’. Therefore, this is a choice of wording that increases the level of certainty in this extract.

Independent variable 10 has relevance concerning specificity, as it points to the need for words carefully used in a way that enables the receiver to understand the relative value of the concepts in the given context. The quote above uses the word ‘partly’ without any elaboration or further detail on how relevant this factor exactly is for the situation that a potential analyst is trying to understand. Hence this choice of wording decreases the degree of specificity.

Sort of Genocide

It was later elaborated on in the same report that the political unwillingness from the RPF could have the following consequences:

“THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND STIR PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN THE PAST.”¹⁶⁶

The way in which the word ‘would’ is used is relevant to assessing certainty and especially to independent variable 4 that concerns words or phrases expressing confidence. The word expresses

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

confidence as it informs that this is something that will for sure ‘perpetuate the current instability and stir passions’. This is threesome something that increases the certainty. The subsequent information in the section, states that the above analysed ‘could’ lead to a sort of genocide (...). As such, a word is used that is less confident than the previous used ‘would’, as the wording ‘could lead to’ leaves the receiver with no certainty of how likely it is that this is going to happen.

Analysing the specificity of the information, both independent variable 9 and 10 have relevance for the inclusion of the wording ‘sort of’ used when describing the potential anti-Tutsi genocide. Independent variable 8 demands words that include a description of their exact meaning in the given context. It can be argued that ‘sort of’ is exactly the opposite of this as it is unclear what sort of version of the genocide is referred to in the section. This is also in alignment with the point put forward to independent variable 10 that requests that words are carefully used in a way that enables the receiver to understand the relative value of the concepts in the given context. The specificity of these two aspects have thus arguably decreased. Henceforward both the wordings ‘could lead to’ and ‘sort of’ are not just a very uncertain claim, but also very unspecific.

Independent variable 8, which also indicates the level of specificity concerns the need for words being used in a way that includes a description of their exact meaning in the given context. It can be argued that since the exact word of ‘genocide’ is used, this is in itself the most specific wording that can be used and does in itself describe it’s meaning as there is an official definition on when a genocide is a genocide – a strong word that should leave no doubt for the receiver. Hence from this analytical perspective the specificity of the section is increased by the usage of the word genocide. The specificity of the section is thus increased by this use of the word genocide.

Genocidal Violence

In the same report the following is set out on the final pages:

“THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ *Supra* note 164, 12.

Certainty is a relevant variable to discuss with regards to the above presented quote. The word likely falls in the category 1 of words indicating uncertainty and does therefore hurt the certainty looking at independent variable 1. Instead of including this, the wording could have been 'will remain' when talking of the threat of genocidal violence.

With respect to certainty, a cause-and-effect relationship is requested to be examined by independent variable 2. A link is created between 'threat of genocidal violence' and 'formal political arrangements' or more precisely it is pointed out that these two do not affect each other in the way that, what will here, be assumed to be the indented aim of these arrangements. Hence there is not established a direct cause-and-effect relationship in this sentence.

Looking into the degree of specificity, independent variable 8 and 10 are relevant as they concern descriptions that elaborate on a word's meaning in the given context and if the words are used in a way that makes the receiver understand the value or degree of a concept in the given context. The usage of the wording 'formal political arrangements' is not elaborated on in order to understand which sort of arrangements there are referred to here and moreover how formal these should be in terms of what they should include.

With regards to specificity and examining independent variable number 10, there should be adjectives that enable the receiver to determine the degree of a given threat. Hence it is important to note that the 'likelihood' or words alike is not included, which could have made it more specific as it would enable the receiver to understand the degree of the threat in the context.

The Report in General: Correspondence Within Report and usage of the G-word

An example of lack of correspondence even within the same reports can be identified in the text which challenges the variable of accuracy, as it hurts the fulfilment of independent variable 5. It is firstly noted as above that a threat is likely to remain if the peace talks do not succeed and later that the threat is likely to remain even if they do. As such, positive aspects of this analysis may also become negative if of lack of dissonance can be identified.

Another relevant variable that has relevance to look at here is accuracy and more specifically independent variable 6, which requests the presence of a clear correspondence between reports and reality, which is assumed to increase if correspondence within the information in the single reports. In this report, the word genocide is used in several places, as illustrated in the quotes presented above. The word is however accompanied by different elaborative words, which results in three different usages of the word throughout the report:

1. Genocidal civil war¹⁶⁸
2. The sort of anti-Tutsi genocide that gripped Rwanda and neighboring Burundi in the past¹⁶⁹
3. Genocidal violence¹⁷⁰

Initially, it may be argued that there is a clear coherence within this report, as the word genocide is used several times, creating a clear understanding of this threat. There is however a difference, for political decision-makers obligated to follow international law, between ‘genocide’ and the wording ‘genocidal civil war’, as well as ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal violence’. As such, it can be argued that while there is a correspondence in the usage of the word genocide, this also decreases the level of accuracy according to independent variable 6, when seen from this preventative perspective.

Accuracy: Sender and time of Writing

From independent variable 7 one finds that the degree of accuracy will increase when knowledge is obtained from people present in the environment, which the information concerns. This report was produced in 1992 and written by Secretary of State in Washington, US. According to this variable the accuracy will decrease looking at these two facts as it was produced (according to the information obtained within the report) by personnel in Washington, hence not in Kigali. Moreover, it can also be discussed whether ‘the environment’ referred to in theory can even exist in 1992, hence referring to both the psychical and social environment in which the genocide took place in 1994.

¹⁶⁸ *Supra* note 164, 2.

¹⁶⁹ *Supra* note 164, 3.

¹⁷⁰ *Supra* note 164, 12.

C: Request for Protection for Informant, NIR-67 (Jan. 11, 1994)

This section analyses the genocide fax, with the official name “Request for Protection for Informant, NIR-67”, which is one of the most famous warnings from Rwanda. This results in a section that examines data relevant for all the variables set out in the theoretical framework. On the 11th of January 1994 a fax from Kigali, which later became known as the ‘Genocide fax’ was sent to DPKO, UN, New York. The official fax no. is the following: 001-250-84273. As embedded in the name it later received, it is argued that this fax in fact informed about the upcoming genocide and thus served as one of the main warnings of the genocide. The fax was sent by UNAMIR and noted as ‘most immediate’ and had the subject line ‘request for protection for informant.’¹⁷¹ This report is referred to as an obvious and clear warning for genocide by the USHMM (2014),¹⁷² Power (2002)¹⁷³, Melvern (2000)¹⁷⁴, Herr (2018),¹⁷⁵ and Boutros-Ghali (1999)¹⁷⁶ amongst others. Moreover Herr (2018) refers powerfully to it as evidence of the “*essential failure of the UN (...)*”¹⁷⁷ subsequently placing the responsibility at their table.

Informing the UN, New York

The Genocide fax and the subsequent information from it was enabled and provided by UNAMIR’s recruited informant, who was the top-level trainer in the Interhamwe. He was in fact paid by the Rwandan government to train the extremist Hutu group Interhamwe and informed that around 1700 members are trained militarily in a camp. The request for protection of the informant is based on the offer of information to UNAMIR on the location of the storage of the weapons to be used for such potential violence.¹⁷⁸ The genocide fax describes, amongst other things, the scope and extent of military training in the Interhamwe.

¹⁷¹ *Supra* note 49, 1.

¹⁷² *Supra* note 157, 1.

¹⁷³ *Supra* note 17, 243.

¹⁷⁴ *Supra* note 92, 92.

¹⁷⁵ *Supra* note 99; Loc 1611, 6053.

¹⁷⁶ *Supra* note 96, 130.

¹⁷⁷ *Supra* note 99, Loc 6053.

¹⁷⁸ *Supra* note 49, 2.

The fax was famously send by General Dallaire in Kigali, which consequently means that it is information directly from someone present in the situation, which the information concerns. This increase the likelihood of the information being accurate when considering independent variable 7, making it an important point to note.

Information from within

The information that he is provided from the informant in question is the following:

“SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN OREDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THE EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSI.”¹⁷⁹

With respect to certainty, there are wordings that can be analysed from this extract to provide some insights to this analysis. Looking at independent variable 1 and 4, these represent the need for respectively exclusion of words indicating uncertainty and wordings that express the opposite, namely confidence. The word ‘suspect’ is used, which means that according to what the informant said, this is not something that he knows but his own analysis and subsequent conclusion. Hence this can be analysed as a lack of certainty according to independent variable 1 and 4 as it is a word that express uncertainty.

Independent variable 2, which also deals with certainty, is also relevant here. It points to the need for a clear cause-and-effect relationship, which should ideally also include triggering mechanisms. A cause-and-effect relationship is described through the sequence of the information. Referring to the fact that it is first noted that there has been an order that Tutsis should be registered and subsequently that if this happens then it can result killings, moreover listing out the amount. This thus increases the certainty according to independent variable 2, as it touches upon what a triggering mechanism/basis for these events.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

While this might seem as an obvious preparation for a genocide, it is important to note that the word suspected is used. This means we are dealing with an informant who is not certain that this is what is being prepared for, but he suspects that this is the plan.

The following is moreover set out:

“INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS.”¹⁸⁰

This sentence provides insights if analysed along several of the variables set out in Figure 2. Looking at certainty first, the expression ‘may commence’ is noteworthy. Independent variable 1 notes that words that indicate uncertainty should be excluded. Therefore, the usage of the words ‘may’ decreases the degree of certainty, as it expresses exactly the opposite - namely uncertainty.

Subsequently analysing the variable of certainty, independent variable 2 notes that there should be a description of a clear cause-and-effect relationship, including triggering mechanisms. Within this sentence such a relationship is created as it reads that the hostilities can be caused ‘if the political deadlock ends’. Thus, there is created a relationship between the hostilities and the status of the political deadlock. This in itself is good for the warning process as it increases the certainty, enabling analysts to better link events and subsequently predict the future events.

Reservations: Degrading value of information altogether

In the very last section the fax reads:

“FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION (...) POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP IS NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON.”¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Analysing the extract above, with regards to certainty, one firstly finds that there is a very obvious inclusion of a word that decreases the certainty. Under independent variable 3 it is set out that exclusions of reservations will increase the level of certainty, and in the above quote it says directly that ‘force commander does have certain reservations’ with regards to the information obtained and informed about in the report. As such, independent variable 3 is not fulfilled.

Beside this, there are further wording that decrease the degree of certainty of this quote. Looking at independent variables 1 and 4, we search for words that indicate uncertainty and additionally look words that express confidence. Therefore, the word ‘may’ decreases the degree of certainty as it is a word that expresses uncertainty, in contrast to for example words such as ‘is’, ‘will’, ‘is for sure’ etc.

The variables determining the degree of specificity are furthermore also relevant, due to the lack of elaboration on ‘not fully excluded’ in the extract. According to point 8 and 10, words should be supported by descriptions that elaborate on their meaning in the specific context if this is not given by the word itself. Moreover, words should, in line with this, be used carefully in order for the receiver to understand the value of the word in the given context. Writing that the possibility is ‘not fully excluded’ does not fulfil these two points, as one does not get any information on which degree it can be fully excluded and as such, if it is expected to become relevant.

The findings presented above concerning the ‘reservation’ have crucial significance when determining the value of the rest of the information in the report as well. It is so, as the information in the report is mainly information passed on by this very informant – and therefore should be seen in the light of this last section of the report.

Analysing accuracy, particularly through independent variable 7, is furthermore relevant with regards to this quote. Variable 7 concerns the origin of the knowledge presented, which ideally should be from a person present in the environment, which the information concerns. In this case the information first of all comes from the mission present in Kigali, which according to theory should increase the accuracy. It is additionally evident that the informant is very much in the middle of the situation, which the information concerns. In this case, the senders should therefore also be given attention. What makes the matter complex in terms of quality, is as already stated the reservation, due to exactly the person who provides the information.

D: The Military and The Transition to Peace (Feb. 17, 1994)

The next document to be analyzed is a report from the US Embassy in Kigali called “*The Military and The Transition to Peace*” from the 17th of February 1994. This section will to a large degree focus on the political aspect and how this was portrayed. All three dependent variables will subsequently be applied in the analysis. Moreover, the report also provides scenario-building, which gives option for additional analysis. The report has as the other documents subject to this analysis, been presented by some scholars as good warning. This report in particular, has been argued to include an estimated possibility of a military coup and subsequent ‘serious evidence’ of such one.¹⁸² The report is also referred to by William Ferroggio (2004) that displays it as a report that provide warnings of genocide in terms of three scenarios.¹⁸³ As such, this is a report that has been portrayed and praised specifically for working towards scenario building and the subsequent probability measurement. The report mainly concerns the situation of the relation between the peace negotiations and what the current state of mind is between the hostile groups.

Certain and Confident links

The beginning of the report reads as follows:

*“ETHNIC PREJUDICES ON BOTH SIDES PERSIST AND WILL HAVE TO BE OVERCOME DURING INTEGRATED TRAINING. PROPER HANDLING OF FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION IS THE KEY TO SECURING MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE.”*¹⁸⁴

Independent variable 1, 3 and 4 are relevant to examine here because there are no words expressing uncertainty or reservations. It is so at it uses expressions such as ‘will have to be’ and ‘is the key to’ (...). These are words that leave no doubt about how this should be interpreted or if there is a link or not with relevance for probability measures. Moreover, and as demanded by independent variable 2

¹⁸² *Supra* note 157, 1.

¹⁸³ *Supra* note 98, 1.

¹⁸⁴ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, US Embassy Kigali, “*The Military and The Transition to Peace*,” February 17 (1994), 2, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%205.pdf>).

there is indirectly established a cause-and-effect relationship between training and a consequent 'military support of the transition to peace'. The same goes for the relation indirectly established between the ethnic prejudices and integrated training, which is presented as the cure to these. There is thus a high degree of certainty in this section of the report and consequently certainty of good quality.

Analyzing the accuracy of this excerpt through independent variable 5, the accuracy moreover proves to affect the certainty indirectly. As such, it can be discussed whether the wording used provides comprehensive information that portrays reality correctly. First of all, the ethnic prejudices are presented as something that can be overcome through integrated training within the military. On the one hand, 'prejudices' is arguably a very vague word to describe the hateful relationship that existed between the two ethnic groups at the time.

Regarding specificity, one finds that according to independent variable 8 there is a need for more elaboration on 'ethnic prejudices', hence what this means in the specific context. In this context, there is a need to distinguish whether what is referred to, is just a hostile tension at a soccer game or if it is hatred that lead to ethnic violence and killings. With regards to this one finds that it could have been more specific. This extract can furthermore be analyzed through independent variable 9, which focuses on exclusion of words that serve solely to broaden the interpretative scope. Words that only serve to broaden the interpretative scope are not included in this extract, which therefore increase its degree of specificity.

This independent variable has further relevance, as it concerns how words are used in ways that enable an understanding of the relative meaning of a concept in the given context. The usage of the word 'proper' describing the required handling this situation, is not followed up by further elaboration on which sort of handling and hence what this 'proper' would be understood to include. Hence the specificity of this extract is decreased in this aspect.

In continuation of the above analyzed sample of the report, it continues informing about the possible tensions between the two main parties to the conflict:

“THE GOODWILL DISPLAYED AT THE NSJ CONFERENCE BETWEEN RGF AND RPA OFFICERS SUGGESTED THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES COULD BE SHORT LIVED IN THE NEWLY INTEGRATED ARMY.”¹⁸⁵

Analyzing this quote through variable 10, enables an outlook into whether words are accompanied by information that enable the receiver to understand the value, degree or meaning of the word in the given context. With respect to this, it is valuable to note the usage of the word ‘goodwill’, which is used when describing the signs showed in the relationship between the hostile groups. It would have increased the specificity if it had been supported by some elaborative words that could enlighten on whether this is political goodwill, will to end the violence or if it was merely being polite to each other for public display.

The report furthermore notes that RGF and RPF officers had been seen holding hands, which is a custom expressing friendship in Rwanda.¹⁸⁶ The above is mostly relevant when discussing certainty, as the inclusion of ‘could be’ makes it hard for the receiver to determine the relevance of the information referring to independent variable 1.

Scenario-building

The next quotes are taken from a section in the report that has the headline ‘Scenarios for upcoming demobilization and integration’. The 3 scenarios set out are all estimated to be possible outcomes under the *“third phase of the peace process in which UNAMIR will oversee disarmament, force integration, and demobilization.”¹⁸⁷* The first scenario basically includes a peaceful process and democratic outcome, which is the scenarios hoped for.¹⁸⁸ The second scenario is that lower-level officers start acting on their own and stirs further violent conflict. With regards to this second scenario it reads that this:

¹⁸⁵ *Supra* note 184, 10.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Supra* note 184, 11.

“(...) COULD BE TRIGGERED BY FEARS OF DEMOBILIZATION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION OR TRAINING OR BY THE ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTEGRATED RGF AND RPF UNITS.”¹⁸⁹

The language ‘could be’ is thus additionally applied in this quote, as seen in the prior, in a way that decreases the certainty of the information. On the other hand, it is very noteworthy that the word ‘triggered’ is used, as this can be seen as an attempt to establish triggering factors. As set out under independent variable 2 - the good description of a cause and effect relationship also includes informing about the triggering mechanism, hence what will stir this to happen. The third and worst scenario listed out is a coup. After setting out these three options the report continues to read the following:

“THE RESULTS OF ANY COUP WOULD BE CATASTROPIC AND COULD RESULT IN ETHNIC BACKLASH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE SIMILAR TO THAT WITNESSED IN BURUNDI.”¹⁹⁰

The third scenario discloses that the result of a coup will lead to something else. Hence a cause-and-effect relationship is established, where the coup is identified as the trigger mechanism. The certainty is thus increased, as it fulfills independent variable 2. The quote additionally reads that this ‘could result’ in an ethnic backlash. This is moreover an example of ‘could’ used in a way that decreases certainty, as it is not that strong in contrast for example ‘would’. Certainty is thus decreased according to independent variables 1 and 4.

The wording used to describe what this will lead to is additionally noteworthy, as it is a reference to a previous event. Here the words ‘ethnic backlash’ are used to describe the event and furthermore a direct reference to the previous violence in Burundi.

Significantly noteworthy a very clear and simple sentence is coming next, highly affecting one’s interpretation of the above listed scenarios, namely the following:

¹⁸⁹ *Supra* note 184, 10.

¹⁹⁰ *Supra* note 184, 13.

“AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A COUP D’ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARD.”¹⁹¹

This piece of information is of very good quality, contrary to others provided in this report. First of all, independent variable 1 is fulfilled as there is no inclusion of words that indicate uncertainty. The wording ‘there is no serious evidence’ is in that sense of really good quality and expresses a high degree of certainty, in contrast to if it had set: ‘it does not look like’ or something alike. Moreover, there are no reservations included after this is stated. There is no sentence added that reads: ‘this does however not mean that this cannot be the case.’ Hence independent variable 3 is also highly fulfilled and there is in general a very high degree of certainty.

Regarding specificity and independent variable 8, one can look at the language ‘no serious’ and assess how specific this is in the given context. On the other hand, this is a report to be used in a military and political context. Thus, we can arguably assume that if it is directly stated that it is not serious evidence, then it should not be taken into consideration. In this case, the wording would be very precise, as I would mean that there is no evidence of significance, subsequently leaving no doubt. Besides, it is added and thus strengthened further when it moreover adds ‘of any kind’.

With regards to accuracy, one cannot say that it was not accurate to note that there was no serious evidence, as it might be correct, from the perspective of the producer of the report. Hence independent variable 5 is complex to examine in this report. As such, analyzing the report through independent variable 6 and thus assessing the consistency within the report becomes relevant. It will therefore be attempted in the end of this section when addressing the report altogether.

Lastly the report reads:

“WHETHER THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IS UNCERTAIN.”¹⁹²

This last quote emphasizes the degree of uncertainty of the whole report and its information in general. It is so as the probability of a coup d’etat, on which the scenarios build upon, depends on

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

whether ‘there is a critical mass in the armed forces for positive change’. This quote directly states that this is ‘uncertain’. Hence there is an obvious problem with respect to all the 4 independent variables related to the degree of certainty.

The usage of the wording ‘critical mass’ can also be questioned with regards to specificity. As set out under independent variable 10, one might ask as to what degree it is a wording used in a way that make the receiver understand the relative value in the given context. As such, it can be discussed what a ‘critical mass’ means; is that 50% or 80%?

E: Telex #24, From MINAFET to DELBELONU (Feb. 25, 1994)

The next document presented is analysed through all three dependent variables, and will moreover provide further insights on the usage of the word genocide or lack thereof. On February 25, 1994, a fax was sent by the Belgium foreign ministry to the UN. The name of the fax was “Telex #24, From MINAFET to DELBELONU”. However, by USHMM (2014) it is presented as ‘Warning of “Genocide” in Rwanda’ and henceforward given that name in the headline. This underlines the centrality that they think it should be provided, in arguing that warnings were in place.¹⁹³ Additionally, Stanton (2009) additionally argues that this report was an “*explicit warning to the UN Secretary General of impending genocide*”.¹⁹⁴ Finally, White (2005) amongst others has argued that especially the warnings from Belgium in general especially, this one included, were proof that a genocide was going to take place.¹⁹⁵ Hence it is presented as a central and important source, on the basis of which authors argue that the warnings were of good quality along with the warning process itself.

¹⁹³ *Supra* note 97, 1.

¹⁹⁴ Gregory H. Stanton, “*The Rwandan Genocide: Why early warning failed*”, *Journal of American Conflicts and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1/2, September, (2009), 8.

¹⁹⁵ *Supra* note 93, 34.

A Bloodbath

An extract from this document reads:

“THE POLITICAL ASSASINATIONS, THE ENSUING UNREST, AND THE WORSENING OF THE CLIMATE OF SAFETY, COULD WELL LEAD TO A NEW BLOODBATH. IT WILL BE NESSESARY TO INCREASE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE (...)”¹⁹⁶

Independent variable 2 depicts that the inclusion of a cause-and-effect relation in predicting increases the degree of certainty of the information. This section firstly connects the political assassinations to the civil violence that followed this event. It is so as it first mentions, that it is due to this event and subsequently how it generally affects the safety of the population. The wording is central, especially in the line that reads ‘could well lead to a new bloodbath’. On the other hand, analysing it through independent variable 9, the wording ‘could well’ can be argued to decrease the degree of specificity as they fall in the category of words that broaden the interpretative scope in terms of probability that the event will occur. Stating that an increase in diplomatic and political pressure will be needed, leads an inclusion of an additional cause-and-effect relationship. It is so as there is a link drawn between the possible events and this as the necessary response. This would be seen as something that will increase the degree of the certainty according to theory. However, problems can arise with respect to accuracy, which will be elaborated on just beneath.

The usage of the word ‘bloodbath’ is relevant for the specificity of this quote. If it had, as set out in point 8, included words or accounts that include a description of exact meaning of a wording in the specific context it would have ensured a more accurate and correct analysis for the recipient, for example an interpretation of it as being equivalent to a genocide.

There are no reservations included and the section is thus strengthened in terms of certainty and point 3 is thus fulfilled. An analysis of the certainty of this quote seems arguably an assessment of whether ‘could well’ should be understood as words that express confidence leaves a feeling of uncertainty.

¹⁹⁶ National Security Achieve, George Washington University, “Telex #24, From MINAFET to DELBELONU,” February 25, (1994), 1, (Available at: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1015806/19940225-gob-bsrr-translation.pdf>).

There is a consequent lack of quality in terms of accuracy to be identified both with respect to point 5 and 6, that is, comprehensive information and a match between information and the reality on the ground. Problems arise as there is indirectly painted a picture, where political and diplomatic measures match the level of the violent events on the ground. This can consequently be understood by the receiver as the appropriate measure and henceforth a remedy to make the violence decrease or stop.

Hence independent variable 2 furthermore relevant to assess, as it concerns the presence of a cause-and-effect relationship. This can be identified here, as a there is made a link between the conflict and subsequently political and diplomatic pressure as the cure is produced.

If a Genocide had Happened ...

Following this first part, which concerns the potential violence without using the actual word genocide, the word is used in a subsequent section, which refers to the restrictions from the UN for the peacekeepers to stay passive.

The section reads following:

“IF THE SITUATION HAD INDEED DEGENERATED AND THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDER HAD STAYED IN EFFECT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNACCEPTABLE, IN THE PUBLIC OPINION, FOR BELGIUM BLUE BERETS TO BE PASSIVE WITNESSES TO GENOCIDE (...)”¹⁹⁷

According to independent variable 6, there should be a clear correspondence between the information given within the single report. This extract uses the exact word of genocide. By doing so, it decreases the degree of accuracy by not providing a clear correspondence between the word ‘genocide’ and the word ‘bloodbath’ earlier used in the report. On the other hand, it may also be seen as an elaboration of the prior mentioned ‘bloodbath’. As such, it then contributes to a clearer understanding of the word in the given context as requested by independent variable 10, which concerns specificity.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Detailing, independent variable 10 deals with words being carefully used in a way that enables the receiver to understand the relative value, degree or meaning of the concepts in the given context. In this case, what is missing in terms of this kind of specificity, is a more elaborative account of what the word ‘degenerated’ means in the given context. Phrased differently - what the genocide would look like as set out under point 10.

Moreover, it is important to note that independent variable 2 is furthermore not fulfilled, as it requests the presence of a clear cause-and-effect relationship, including triggering mechanisms. Just as this decreases the specificity, it also reduces the certainty considering it being used for forecasting and hence prospectively. Even though it is set out that the situation would have generated into a genocide, there is no mention of what would have triggered this – hence what to look for in the near future when trying to estimate the possibility of a genocide. One can thus just happily conclude that it did not happen, while worrying about when and how it will happen, without the knowledge to take measures and prevent it in a targeted way.

The degree of accuracy overall for this fax, is reduced in accordance to point number 7. Evident, as the information does not come from persons present in the situation, which the information concerns.

Examining Coherence: Bloodbath or Genocide?

As set out in the table under the variable of accuracy, independent variable 6 requests that there is a clear correspondence between the information within a report. This report uses both the word bloodbath and the word genocide when describing the potential violence.¹⁹⁸ Despite the reasonable supposition that genocide is often also a bloodbath, the same does not go the other way around: A bloodbath is not necessarily a genocide. Therefore, it can be argued that this usage of two different words within the same report consequently hurts the accuracy.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Summary of Analytical Findings

This section serves to sum up the findings from the analysis of the five documents applied in this chapter and subsequently shortly compare them to the arguments or descriptions that the scholars having applied them have provided. More importantly, the aim is to subsequently answer the first of the sub-research questions, which is the following: *How did the data manage to deal with the challenges within warning-response processes?* Insights and findings from answering this question will then serve as the basis for a discussion of the additional research questions.

All the documents examined in this analysis have been used by scholars to argue that the decision-actors and others, who had the power to prevent the genocide, could have done so as these serve as proof that there was knowledge that a genocide would take place. From the assessment of these five sources, it is obviously not reasonable or scientifically valid to conclude that this is wrong; that the decision-makers did not know. It is however legitimate to respond the first sub-research question with the following answer: The data that scholars argue was clear, obvious, and good warning did not in all aspects manage to deal well with the challenges of warning-response processes. There are, as illustrated, also aspects of the reports that are good, whether focusing on certainty, accuracy or specificity. However, it is also reasonable to conclude that they are not perfect and that there certainly is substance relevant for a discussion with respect to the remaining research questions. The points to be taken with respect to the problematic aspects relevant for the discussion of this thesis, will be set out in the following chapter. These points will be used to illustrate, which important discussions can be left in the dark when scholars present the data as being of sufficient quality with respect to preventing of the genocide.

Having illustrated how the data was in most cases of poor quality in terms of providing basis for preventative actions, the question is now if this is what actually matters in the process? The answer is that it does, which subsequently suggests that it is not forthrightly legitimate to judge the lack of intervention in Rwanda, as solely a lack of political will. This significance will be additionally illustrated in the discussion.

Chapter V: Discussion

Structure of Discussion

This chapter aims at discussing the findings of the analysis in this research. This will mainly be done focusing on the two sub-research questions, hence searching for both alternative explanations to the failure and discuss what this all means for the field of warning-response with respect to genocide. In the end of the discussion it will be illustrated how the answering of the three sub-research questions together form an answer to the main research question.

Alternative Explanations: Division and Gaps

This first part of the discussion serves to address the second sub-research question: *Can new insights along with these findings suggest alternative explanation to this failure to prevent?* This will be answered by drawing on some of the main points and dilemmas that can be identified by looking at the findings from the analysis. It is therefore important to note that this section does not aim at proving that it was not a lack of political will, that resulted in the genocide not being prevented in 1994 – but to shed light on alternative explanations, subsequently enabling the following discussion of what the missing focus on these, can cause in terms of misunderstandings and lack of development in both theory and practice with respect to genocide prevention. These first sections focusing on alternative explanations will not be as extensive as the sections discussing the theoretical implications, as these mainly serve to enable the latter.

Usage of the word Genocide

First of all, it should be noted that, as often argued - there was a mentioning of genocide. However, it can also be argued that it was not obvious and explicit, as contended by some scholars. In the analysis, it was illustrated that the usage of the word in the reports was challenged to a significant degree by certainty, accuracy and specificity. Hence an important point to be made is that even when the word genocide was applied it was not used in a manner that enabled it to serve its purpose of actionable warning. And why is it so?

One point, which was identified that illustrates that problem, is that when the word genocide is used there is at the same time a high degree of uncertainty. On the other hand, when less specific and accurate words are used, there is a higher degree of certainty. This means that the receiver can possibly get the impression that there is more certainty of other events, than a genocide. An example of this is document A that uses the expression 'physical elimination' about the killings it predicts will occur, and subsequently uses the word 'would', which indicate a good degree of certainty.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, Document B moreover illustrates this, as it uses the expression 'genocidal civil war', which is a stronger wording to than just civil war. However, the degree of certainty is subsequently decreased by using the wording 'the possibility of this will loom'.²⁰⁰ Hence what demonstrates the following argument: When the word 'genocide' is used, there is an extremely high degree of uncertainty. The reason why this observation matters is the following.

Chan (1999) argues that certainty is the most important variables determining the quality of intelligence.²⁰¹ While one cannot possibly argue that it is not true that certainty is important, this finding just noted above illustrates that one variable is not more important than the other, as they do not function without each other. Where there is a high degree of certainty, the data is not more useful than the other, as it is one the other hand possible unspecific and inaccurate. This example with the usage of the word genocide, illustrates the inconsistent application of the word along with descriptions of different meanings made the word loose its credibility even when applied. It has additionally been illustrated that within some reports even direct contradictions can be found, which underlines the poor quality identified within the single reports. This could serve as an alternative explanation to the failure to prevent, as the information did not form an ideal basis for properly identifying, measuring and dealing with the risk of genocide.

Inconsistency: Political, Military, or civil focus?

Another and second insight that the analysis of the documents brings forward is another form of inconsistency within the reports. This concerns the focus there was when looking for the correct cure to the tensions and violence in Rwanda. In report B, there is a focus on the willingness of the Rwandan president as being central to the situation of the violence and additionally that the violence

¹⁹⁹ *Supra* note 159, 1.

²⁰⁰ *Supra* note 164, 2.

²⁰¹ *Supra* note 25, 172.

will escalate if the peace talks in Arusha fails.²⁰² The probability set out concerning potential violence if these measures for peace fail is quite good in terms of certainty, as illustrated previously. When it is subsequently noted that such chance of genocide could remain, the language is adjusted so that it entails a lesser degree of certainty.²⁰³ While this also illustrates the argument from the previous section, there is another very relevant point to be made.

While the need for a ceasefire does not exclude that other means could be necessary, it signifies a focus on the political aspect and not so much on the civil society. This is moreover a general tendency, which is a top-down focus in terms of actors. Along with this it also demonstrates a dominating discourse surrounding Rwanda at the time, that portrayed it as a civil war and hence a conflict that was not different from others.

This same problem can also be identified in Document D where the suggestion for curing the violence is integrated training in the military.²⁰⁴ Hence it is indirectly argued that this can prevent further violence. This confusion is also illustrated in the Genocide Fax, report C, where the informant notifies UNAMIR that a political deadlock will increase the chance of violence initiating again.²⁰⁵ Even though this is very much uncertain, due to reservations and the language applied by the informant – the link in itself is not. The link made is the following: The political deadlock affects the degree of violence that will come. If this is correct, or not, we will never know. It is however a valid and legitimate point for decision-makers who are to determine whether there should be an intervention or not, the fact that a lot of the information gets back to political tools are the cure, does not increase the likelihood that they will see a military intervention as the only option. This is also in line with George and Holl (1999) who argues that the warning-response gap can be explained due to the fact that decision-makers often think that low stakes are at risk.

These are very fundamental tendencies and problems caused by the three challenges. This therefore illustrates that other conclusions are also possible to draw from the data, as unprecise and inconsistent data can have caused first of all cognitive challenges but also not provided foundation for proper analysis, in terms of identifying the right cure to the problem. This consequently means that the analyst providing decision-makers has no solid basis and furthermore decision-makers could have experienced cognitive problems after receiving the. However, potentially countering this

²⁰² *Supra* note 164; 2, 3.

²⁰³ *Supra* note 164, 12.

²⁰⁴ *Supra* note 184, 2.

²⁰⁵ *Supra* note 49, 2.

interpretation is the identification of reports arguing a lack of political will to implement the peace process to its full by the parties to the conflict in Rwanda.²⁰⁶ It was moreover expressed in a very specific and certain manner, that this could be identified due to the practical failure of installing the government.²⁰⁷ This would indicate that they knew what there was a great chance that the peace process was not going to serve its purpose. It was also contained in a report that the discussions in the UNSC were not as effective as what one could wish for and subsequently noted that *“The UN and its member states just have other preoccupations these days.”*²⁰⁸ These are points that should still be recognized along with the other findings pointing towards the presence of a good warning of genocide at the time. Again, it should also be noted that the above presented points do of course not by nature exclude the possibility that there was also a lack of political will, which might have been the case. However, in the light of the findings in the analysis of the intelligence sent out prior to the genocide in Rwanda, it can still be argued that these above-mentioned points are challenges that extend to more than just being willing to prevent genocide, which can have caused the lack of prevention.

Cognitive Limitations: Dissonance or simply Confusion

In the light of some of the points made by George and Holl (1999), suggestions drawn from insights developed in the previous section can additionally be made. Here, the points referred to are especially those that sets out that an overload of inconsistent information can lead to politicians ending up being passive. Furthermore, that it should at all times be kept in mind that there is always a risk for politicians to produce further harm, which they are in each situation to put up against a potential situation, that they are not sure will take place.²⁰⁹ The above examples illustrate that this can also be a problem that should firstly, be given more attention and secondly could also have caused the lack of preventative action in Rwanda.

Hence, the cognitive dissonance as explained in the literature review is furthermore relevant as it to a high degree also is linked to the previous section and can provide additional explanation. Meyer et.

²⁰⁶ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, US Department of State, “Kigali 00551”, February 7 (1994), 1-4, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw25.pdf>).

²⁰⁷ *Supra* note 206, 2.

²⁰⁸ The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, US Embassy in Kampala, “Kampala 07873,” 6 October (1993), 2, (Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw04.pdf>).

²⁰⁹ *Supra* note 24; 9, 10.

al. (2010) are definitely onto something by unpacking the concept of political will and pointing to more precise areas where things can be changed. The third suggested alternative explanation is henceforward that there was an overload of information, which the decision-makers were unable to sort and use as a basis for intervention.

Issues of Scenario-building

As this point it is evident that this research demonstrates that prediction is highly challenged, but what about scenario-building specifically? Bernstein et. al. (2000) does as already noted, argue that scenario-building is the best alternative that social science has, as he underlines that social science does not have the same options of predicting through experiments and measures as for example natural science.²¹⁰ Assuming that this argument is right, let's take a look at the issues identified with scenario building, from the documents subject to analysis in this work.

In document D named "The Military Transition to Peace" scenarios are set out. Scholars present it as being of great quality and subsequently argues that it illustrates good and easily accessible scenario-building method. The following will however summarize the findings concerning this report and discuss whether these can, in contrast to this view, explain some the failure to prevent the genocide. There is a tendency, as seen prior in other reports, where the more serious, or the more violence the scenario includes the more the certainty is decreased. There is moreover a lack of accuracy and specificity with respect to describing what will happen if these scenarios play out. Lastly and most noteworthy, there is a reservation that concerns all the scenarios set out, stating that there is no proof of the factors that are basis for such scenarios to play out.²¹¹ As this document D is presented by scholars as being the good warning, we can fairly assume that this is as good as scenario-building was concerning Rwanda in 1994. Henceforward that this is the best quality that was delivered. Having this laid out, we have both arguments that say that this is the best form of predicting and forecasting and moreover basis for considering this specific report as being the good example.

From this perspective, it is arguable reasonable to conclude the decision-makers are not able to determine as intervention based on these scenarios, despite being specific and accurate scenarios, as they are all referred to with a reservation, which decreases the certainty that they will occur.

²¹⁰ *Supra* note 25, 44.

²¹¹ *Supra* note 184, 13.

A Question of Human Resources?

The last alternative explanation to the failure to prevent, which can be drawn from this study concerns the question of human resources and its effects on the quality of the warnings. Adelman and Suhrke (1996) argue that there was not enough staff on the ground in Rwanda to do the work that effective early warning required. This research additionally supports this, assuming for now that warnings providing a fair basis for intervention under current international law are actually possible. As such, it can firstly be concluded that the warnings within the analysed reports were not perfect – hence an increase in both personal and know-how could have improved them. A counterargument is however that an increase in personnel could have decreased the level of accuracy due to a higher level of inconsistency, resulting from a further increase of the information load. Therefore, it is not reasonable, to use this work as a basis for suggesting that this was an alternative explanation of this failure, as this seems as a completely different discussion, requiring another theoretical framework and approach.

There is however another angle that might be relevant here, which does also indirectly concerns human resources and capabilities Barnett (1997) notes that the cables, for example within US Department of State and the UN, were expected to “*provide a narrative that weaves together various perspectives that derive from personal, bureaucratic, and US-centred positions*” and that they are moreover very political.²¹² In the same context the states that these are also often expected to be centred around and reflect the interest of the given organization or state.²¹³ The question of lack of political will is very relevant with regards to this, as this is necessary information that supports this argument – as put forward in some of the scholars presented earlier in this work. This can in fact also be a discussion of human capabilities, which will be touched upon further in the next section concerning the implications for theory and practice within the field of genocide prevention.

²¹² Michael N. Barnett, “*The UN Security Council: Indifference and the Genocide in Rwanda*” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol.12, No.4, (1997), 556.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

Theory and Practice: Implications for Genocide Prevention

This section will provide answers to the last sub-research question: *What do these insights mean for the field of warning-response with respect to genocide?* Finally, it will clearly summarize and explain how this thesis so far has provided answer to the main research question and furthermore how this is situated within the problem statement set out in the introduction.

Mens rea and Intervention

In this section, the idea that the problem can also concern legal provisions that do not provide an effective interactive basis with the field of warning-response will be discussed. This is done in the light of the findings set out till now. There is obviously a practical problem in terms of identifying exactly when and under which circumstances there should be an intervention. The CPPCG, Article III reads that the crime covers conspiracy, attempt, and “*direct and public incitement to commit genocide*”.²¹⁴ The physical acts partly constituting a genocide moreover only does so if “*committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part*” one of the protected groups. Relevant for this analysis is the ethnic group set out under these protected groups.²¹⁵ Henceforward there are clear provisions, which set out that killings or other acts, with such purpose, constitute the crime of genocide. While there exists no doubt today that there was such an intent to commit genocide, also prior to its occurrence, it all comes down to whether it was interpreted as such prior to the genocide. For such interpretation to be accurate and certain, the analyst needs to know what language will constitute such ‘incitement’, if not including the exact word of ‘genocide’. Hence it has often been seen that other wordings or references are used in this incitement and not the direct language. In Rwanda, it was for example the language of cockroaches used to describe the Tutsi population subsequently inciting their extermination.²¹⁶ This study about Rwanda has showed that the ‘maybe’ existence of a genocide is not enough. From a legal perspective, the intent should play a significant role but this is evidently not always what is seen. Goldman (2011) argues that there is a need for more verbal intelligence, which

²¹⁴ *Supra* note 8, Art. III.

²¹⁵ *Supra* note 8, Art. II.

²¹⁶ PeaceTech Lab, “*Social Media and Conflict in South Sudan: A Lexicon of Hate speech*”, (2017), 14, (Available at:

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54257189e4b0ac0d5fca1566/t/5851c214725e25c531901330/1481753114460/PeaceTech+Lab+SouthSudanLexicon.pdf>).

can arguably also increase the likelihood that intent of genocide can be identified. More verbal intelligence may however, as seen in previous findings of this study, create greater uncertainty. This leads us to further discussion.

It is only *actus reus* that Matters?

Goldsmith (2010) notes that intent is hard to identify, but is it really so? Maybe there is just a tendency that it is not taken seriously before it is accompanied by *actus reus*. If that is the case, then it is obviously hard to recognize prior to the eruption of genocide. The intent included in the definition of the crime, should function as this trigger for intervention. However, it can clearly be seen that this is not the case, before it is accompanied by its *actus reus* both in Rwanda and also today in South Sudan.

The problem is that there are many ways of interpreting this. This is something that would require a precise description of the framework in which it should be interpreted – hence more than the ones found today. Today there are moreover cases where similar language is applied but where genocide has not yet occurred between the groups of concern. An example of this can be found in South Sudan where politicians, including government leaders, have practiced hate speech on social media and other platforms that explicitly use rhetoric that refers to discrimination along ethnic lines.²¹⁷ An example is the concept ‘MTN’, used in this context, which refers to the mobile slogan of the telecommunication company, which holds a large part of the market in South Sudan. It is used to refer to Dinka people or sometimes describing Dinka presence in the government. The background for this reference is the MTN slogan that reads ‘*MTN: Everywhere you go*’. It is used especially by Nuer people as an offensive phrase to indicate that Dinka people are everywhere. The intentions are also to spread the fear amongst people that the Dinka people will take the control of everything, especially the government and thus the ruling of the country. Moreover, interviews have been conducted by a local group investigating hate speech where a man informed that the phrase ‘no service available’ has sometimes been used to describe a Dinka who is unarmed and therefore should be attacked.²¹⁸ This example is to illustrate that even though a clear intent can be identified, it is not

²¹⁷ United Nations Human Rights Council, “*Report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan*”, A/HRC/34/63, 6 March (2017), 7.

²¹⁸ Open Situation Room Exchange, Hate Speech: Countering Hate speech, South Sudan, Accessed 14 May 2019, (Available at: <http://www.osrx.org/ssd-hatespeech>).

something that is referred to as a crime but more often as something that might indicate the risk of the crime of genocide.²¹⁹

In line with the argument by Nelson (2016) it can be argued that there is a greater need to focus more on *actus reus* and subsequently let the number of deaths have a greater significance in terms of the legal limitations of both intervention and transitional justice. For the law to function it must match the reality – and there is, as this study illustrates, a reality that points to some human cognitive limitations in terms of firstly establishing the verbal intent and secondly determining an intervention on the basis of such a suggested and estimated intent.

Adelman (1998) provides a suggestion for improvements within the field that can be described as a middle way of the above. He points to the problem of emic understanding and interpretation. This can explain some of the observations made in this research, which come to have a huge significance for the prospects of warning-response of genocide. Adelman's theoretical perspective sets out that a certain culture can be found within the organizational scope of producing the warnings itself.²²⁰ This study shows that some of these ways of producing warnings, might include applying a language that oppose and challenge the very goal that these warnings, namely constituting a basis for preventative action. It is so as it evidently cannot constitute certain, accurate and specific basis for proving intent prior to a genocide.

This point, along with this research, illustrate that it is not enough to focus the main part of the research on indicators and triggering factors. Despite the fact that it is definitely a crucial part of research in the field, it is however not enough to solely focus on this when intending to explain the problem of the warning response gap. The problem can also be identified within the usage of the language, as illustrated in this research. It is thus not in identifying indicators and factors, but the problem of determining the degree and meaning of their presence – and having a common language for these even across cultures, both organizational-, sectoral-, and national-wise. The development of quantitative models might be able to contribute to this, but this would moreover require extensive personal on the ground for providing sufficient amounts of data.

²¹⁹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "R2P Monitor 15 January 2018", Issue 37, (2018), (Available at: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_monitor_jan2018_final.pdf).

²²⁰ *Supra* note 71, 60.

Orthodox, Revisionist, or no cure?

When the Orthodox school argues that the warnings need not be perfectly accurate and certain for the early warning process to succeed, it is important that this is questioned despite the difficult nature of forecasting within social science. From the findings in this study it can be argued that it actually creates huge problems at other levels of the warning process if the warnings do not fulfil these criteria. But the question remains whether something can be done to improve this and more specifically where the resources are best allocated for an improvement in the field. The argument in this thesis does not simply support a Revisionist view neither, however it still points to a demand for more extensive research into better quality of warnings as a lack thereof creates subsequent problems, as illustrated in the previous section. As already underlined, the Revisionist school currently dominates the academic field with respect to this topic of prediction and forecasting within social science. While indicators and triggering factors are indeed important, some of the findings from this research forms a basis for recommending a more Orthodox view - the one not necessarily excluding the other. Thus, arguing for focusing on the more cognitive aspects, including the human limitations and vulnerability, will at least draw more attention to it. Subsequently it will lay out a foundation for examining potential tools to addressing this issue.

The critical views in the literature review that point to problems with forecasting in social science in general, do indeed also have relevance to the findings of this study. As such, because it points to what appears to be a “can’t have it all” problem in terms of certainty, accuracy and specificity – subsequently leaving an unsaid question: Can it ever succeed? This research indicates that studies within this area can be helpful in casting light on some failures in the past. Without providing a comprehensive cure to the problem, they help unpack and unveil some of the problems that might improve prevention if there as a minimum is given more attention and awareness to the process.

From a research perspective, this study points to the importance of giving equal weight to the data assessed and solely drawing upon the points that support one’s argument. Hence it illustrates that when an analytical framework is applied to the data it enables other themes to appear, it can subsequently aid in identifying problems, which are not pre-determined. There is a lack of studies touching upon the, starting with the hypothesis that maybe Rwanda was not preventable. An explanation can additional exist due to the emotional and sensitivity of the topic - the status that the

genocide has gained in international scholar due to its gravity. Henceforward if scholars were to recognize that under the circumstances that were present, this was not preventable, it also means that under similar circumstances, this could happen again.

Summing up: Prospects, Challenges and Solutions

This section focuses on the accumulated meaning of all the arguments previously presented in this work. The discussions presented above might indicate a rather inauspicious picture of prevention of genocide. While this difficult problem of the warning-response gap can obviously not be solved solely based on this research, some insights are still relevant for the improvement of research in the field. The main points of this work can be illustrated by three different sub-conclusions that combined answer the main research question:

By re-examining some of the documents, usually presented as good early warning of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which new insights can be drawn and what does it mean for the field of early warning and prevention of genocide, both in theory and practice?

1. *There is an overestimation of human capabilities, under and in the light of the current political and legal framework*

A thing such as political will is something that the public understands and will easily accept as a reason that crisis was not prevented. However, scholars should be able to go beyond this - even though it is not easy to accept and admit that there are some events that they cannot predict and prevent. This is especially a hard thing to recognize, concerning events that are created by the humans themselves. However, under current international law, and hence the current conditions, there is a need to establish proof of intent to commit genocide before an intervention to prevent it can be mobilized. Subsequently, we can assume a common understanding that the people selected to take these decisions are capable of first of all establishing such intent; proving it and implicitly also determining when there is a basis for intervention. This basis, should be so certain, that the decision-maker after acting, can justify the intervention to the world with the argument ‘something could have happened’ – that is, something that nobody can never really know for sure. This is and have proved an overestimation of the capabilities of these actors.

2. *This framework is erroneously supported by most scholars within the field due a misunderstood and narrow focus*

This study shows that it is important to lay the very foundation for the success of bridging the warning-response gap, instead of paying attention to the problem that appears at the surface and is maybe easier to grasp. This will give the best basis for an improvement of the warnings, and hence the best possible basis for decision-makers as well as for the public and international organizations to put pressure on them. As illustrated, it obviously does not work effectively if the warnings do not fit the options for response. Referring here to the example of the obsessive focus on factors and indicators by scholars as this being the cure to the problem of preventing genocide.

Does this research then exclude or directly oppose these works, including the ones blaming politicians? The answer is both yes and no. It does claim that it is wrong when scholars say that the warnings were clear and obvious, because this study show that this is not the case. Hence even though a lack of political will might also have existed, it is insufficient to judge it as such, based on the material utilized.

One must recognize that despite these warnings, being described as good, they are not good enough in this case. However, this is hard, as it provides less clear answer to ‘what went wrong’ and ‘who should we blame’, which can be hard to accept. It is important to recognize that there is a great challenge with forecasting in social science and this is not a problem that is easy to address. It is subsequently not only a problem that exist at the level where the warnings are produced, but something affects all levels of the process, as seen in Rwanda.

3. *There is a need for a change in international law concerning genocide*

In the light of the two points set out above, this altogether leads to a need for a change in international law. Evident, as there is a mismatch between the warnings produced to prevent genocide and the international law that sets out the legal framework concerning this. There is thus a discrepancy ever present, even with the possibility that the warnings can be improved. Besides these two opposing mechanisms, there is also a third, which is the receiver of the warning. While it is fundamental to analyse the mind-set and analytical capabilities of the one that has to produce the warning, it is furthermore relevant to examine the one that is expected to act upon this warning. The grey zone that

seems to exist in practice, concerning the establishment of the intent, can evidently lead to inaction. When giving more weight to *actus reus*, hence the actual act of killing, one allows the number of killed to have relevance for the basis of intervention, constituting a more objective basis. On the other hand, this will narrow the time space that allows an intervention, as the killings will have started to take place already. Nevertheless, as it is now - is the option of an intervention after killings have initiated not better than no intervention at all? The arguments of this research support that it is. A hybrid form is also possible, in which the relevance of *mens rea* remains but where an additional option for intervention is based on the acts of killing. Examining the potential gain of such change, it is definitely relevant to look for answers within social psychology and political communication as suggested by Meyer et. al (2010).²²¹ This work however argues that the cure is not to be found there but in law. The recipe to the cure, can albeit be written with significant contributions from those fields.

Chapter VI: Limitations of study

In this section, the approach to this research and the subsequent findings will be provided will be discussed. Hence it will be attempted to critically reflect upon this research and point to some of the challenges met throughout the processing of creating this work and moreover how this might have resulted in some points that can be target to critique from an academic perspective.

First of all, one finds that a limited quantity of material is drawn upon for the analysis, making it important that the conclusion from this study are drawn accordingly. Hence, it does not aim at providing knowledge on the quality of the warning-process in general with respect to Rwanda. It rather aims at pointing to a fundamental misunderstanding in the academic field with respect to this specific case and moreover to point to some of the consequences that this might have both in research and subsequently in practice. This being said, this is a balancing act when the research proceeds to point to general trends in the field later on in the research. This has therefore been done with serious consideration, and the temptation to draw conclusions from a basis that does not provide sufficient evidence has been kept in mind at all times throughout the process. Despite this, it can be seen as a

²²¹ *Supra* note 22, 566.

limitation of the study, as some of the arguments developed as a product of the main argument, would have been stronger relying on a bigger pile of data.

Another option for the data collection of this research could have been to collect the data from an official database, which might have enabled an analysis of a more comprehensive data set. If this approach could have made it more valid, it can albeit be questioned as it would hurt the argument that claims unsatisfactory examination of the work that has been conducted by scholars. It is so as it would make myself target for exactly that argument; that data tends to be selected and sampled according to the argument made. This research moreover focuses on the case study in a very general matter, as it does not distinguish between the different actors sending and receiving the warnings. Henceforward it does not discuss whether the Belgium, British or American governments could have known but rather point to general tendencies that can be identified amongst literature on them all.

Lastly, operationalizing variables is always challenging for a researcher, as it should be done in an objective manner that enables the inclusion of all relevant factors to provide valid analysis. This has been attempted but it should still be noted that this position is no less awkward for me it is for other researchers. It is moreover generally hard to evaluate within the field of warning-response, as attempting to evaluate the performance itself includes using the factor and the equation of ‘what could have happened’ when you can never really know for sure. This is something that highly affected the development of the independent variables for the variable of accuracy – one of the main challenges for forecasting, which means that the data should fit the reality. When imagining that the genocide in Rwanda did not happen, then some of the warnings judged to be inaccurate could actually have been exactly accurate. Hence, when operationalizing that variable, one had to find measures that could be identified – at the same time maintaining a method that might consequently have led to mismatching results. Consequently, this was something that proved highly challenging to balance.

Conclusion

It was said in the beginning of this work that the world seemingly only care about the victims of genocide after they have taken place. This might be true, but there could also be a missing point here – that it may not be because of indifference, as the argument implicitly points to. Besides evaluating the views on Rwanda, the study pointed to some problems that are argued to possibly exist both in prior, present and future cases of genocide with respect to the warning-response process. Both the literature presented but also this study shows how complex a matter it is in many aspects. One of the most central points that is touched upon indirectly through the different arguments, is the existence of the need for *mens rea* in the law concerning genocide, which from this research evidently has proved complex to establish. This it at least hard to do, from a theoretical perspective, in a way that it in practice serves as basis for intervention for decision-makers.

It is both fundamental to evaluate when things go well and especially when it goes wrong. Populations today are still in risk of genocide, which makes it very vital to examine what is actually going on in a warning-response process, in order to improve these. It is additionally important to remember that this research only represented a small area of this scope. The awkward position that one finds oneself in when arguing against this mainstream argument, is no less difficult for me, especially with regards to the emotional and sensitive atmospheres surrounding exactly this case of Rwanda in 1994. Throughout this work, I have also been tempted to ignore the results pointing towards my conclusions – subsequently providing myself with someone to blame when thinking of the horrors that took place. However, the lowest demand to academia should be a proper examination that serves as the basis for drawing conclusions, no matter how terrifying or disappointing the conclusions might be; this is still the best starting point for future improvements. This research definitely underlines this importance, as it illustrated that when this is done, it reveals findings that have not been considered in the majority of other studies. If this wrong interpretation and simplification does not come to light, it might streamline the matter in a manner that means that the challenges of forecasting are undermined and therefore not really recognized to the extent that they should. For the problem to be solved, there is thus a first step to identifying the correct central elements, factors and dynamics of warning-response failures. When the political and legal measures in place to prevent genocide were set out in the beginning of the introduction, it was exactly to illustrate that this is where the most dominant work is

being made. This is still needed but let's hope for a development of more alternative studies being heard within this field, to the same extent and with equal weight in the future.

Inevitable we still end up with the question: Can we possibly believe in prediction within social science? The answer is yes, and no. Here it advantages us to unpack the concept once again. People can predict, also within social science – though unsurprisingly sometimes more successfully than other. The important question seems to be if people have the capabilities to manage the predictions in a useful way, which is doubtful that under the current circumstances. We must focus on this, and subsequently eliminate any chance of the field of genocide prevention being subject to the Cassandra syndrome. For the sake of the victims of genocide – but definitely also the witnesses. There must be more hope for them than the kind of desolate hope that the reader must now peruse.

*“I had seen so many children hacked to pieces that this
small, whole, bewildered boy was a vision of hope”*

- Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, 2003 ²²²

Future Research

This is the final section of this work and suggests some ideas for further research in the field. It develops 3 different suggestions, respectively within the disciplines of anthropology and political science, but also touching upon history and sociology.

Firstly, and as already suggested, one finds that research into the legal definition of the crime of genocide and the related process concerning establishing basis for intervention will further the effectiveness, within the field. While this is an area of research that has been continuously examined, this work recommends specific research concerning *actus reus* and its infusion, applying the science of legal anthropology. Also referred to as anthropology of law, this is a discipline that is suited to examine the more empirical aspects of legal procedures.²²³ Specific for legal anthropology, is the

²²² *Supra* note 1, 2.

²²³ Marc Simon Thomas, “*Theorizing Mediation: Lessons Learned from Legal Anthropology*”, *Utrecht Law Review*, (2016), Vol.12 No.1, 53.

focus on processes examined “*within a specific social, legal, economic, political and cultural context.*”²²⁴ This makes it ideal to shed light on some of the problems put forward in this research, as it enables research into both the official and unofficial components of the processes, with a solid theoretical and methodological basis that gives equal weights to both. Furthermore, anthropology do due to the nature of the discipline also takes the actor, hence the human, as the starting point of its analysis. This means it can capture some of the same points as social psychology, but that it might be better suited to include the institutional and organizational cultures and their affects. This will more specifically enable an examination of how a change in the definition of genocide can potentially affect the political process – implicitly facilitating research of the organizational cultures.

Secondly, research combined with the concept of R2P is also suggested. As noted, it seems that intent alone does not tend to trigger an intervention. When the genocides actually happen, it is too late for prevention and only halting is possible. R2P in this respect might hold the potential to enable an intervention not on the basis of genocide, but under circumstances that often come before the genocide. Evans (2008) notes that this will likewise promote the duty of states to intervene. These duties are seemingly already well established however they need more clear guidelines in their operationalization and subsequently lack of common interpretation internationally. The first one therefore concerns the relatively new norm of R2P. Could it be that R2P holds a certain potential in terms of providing some of the bridging in the warning-response gap? It has for example noted by Totten (2004) that if any hope to prevent genocide before they happen, consequently not just intervening while, one of the most important aspect is the human rights violations - often to be identified at an early stage and come to evolve into genocide. This is arguably crucial and therefore something there should be focused on by all actors relevant ²²⁵ Thus conducting research not solely focusing on R2P’s potential in general, but specifically on R2P contributing to the bridging of the warning-response gap, could provide further insight in how this can be operationalized successfully.

The last suggestion for future research concerns the inaccurate portraying of the conflict. Postcolonialism presents different theories that amongst other things touches upon how different discourses have been created and arguable still exist today. Some of the theories argue that a grounded

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ Samuel Totten, “*The Intervention and Prevention of Genocide: Sisyphean or Doable?*”, *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol.6, No.2, June (2004), 243.

narrative of a superior European identity exists, which subsequently can be identified as a common narrative within different disciplines. This has consequently created a discourse about Africans that portray them as a primitive people and moreover as being “*savage, irrational, tribal and unrestrained.*”²²⁶ Some of these lines of interpreting could possibly be identified within the intelligence reports on Rwanda, with respect to not grasping the pattern of violence and the subsequent intentions. For example, the applying of wordings such as ‘civil unrest’ and ‘random violence’, which was applied just a few weeks prior to the genocide could potentially illustrate such tendencies.²²⁷ Research linking warning-response with these postcolonial theories, can potentially shed light and elaborate on the issue of both production and interpretation of the warnings that are culturally biased, henceforward contributing to improvement in the field in that aspect.

²²⁶ Brad S. Long and Mills, Albert J, “*Globalization, postcolonial theory, and organizational analysis: lessons from the Rwanda genocide*”, *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Vol.4, Issue 4, (2008), 393, 394.

²²⁷ UN Security Council, “*Adjustment of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda due to the current situation in Rwanda and settlement of the Rwandan conflict*,” S/RES/912, 21 April (1994), 2.

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ANNEX 1: Data

The following pages of this annex contain the five documents utilized in the analysis. The red letter (A, B, C, D, E) in the left corner indicate their titles, which are to be found in the section on data collection.

A

4.A.4. Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali's message,
October 24th, 1990,
Assessment of the political situation

Declassified

TERTIO: Assessment of the political situation.

The situation is dominated by the combination of two destabilizing behaviors.

- The media and the diplomatic representatives of Rwanda's neighbors, have become, voluntarily or involuntarily, spokespeople for the invaders, or have even supported them openly.

This has just been attested to by the way in which R.F.I. became aware this morning of the mission of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, led by Mr. FEDER, a French national. In fact, while he obviously issued a certificate of good conduct to the Rwandan government, which strives to maintain the best conditions of treatment for suspects, this station retained only the negative items of his report.

- The Belgians continue to maintain confusion, brandishing the threat of a rapid pull-out of their citizens and their parachutists if President HABYARIMANA does not agree to exorbitant and unjustified capitulations.

These two behaviors are of a nature to discourage the governmental authorities ready to make important concessions. They cannot accept, in particular, abandoning some territory, in order to establish a cease-fire, to the profit of the Tutsi invaders eager to retake the power they lost in 1959. They can even less admit that these invaders, disregarding Rwandan reality, will probably reestablish the Honni regime of the first Tutsi kingdom, once installed in the northeast. This reestablishment, explicit or disguised, would result in the physical elimination of Tutsis in the interior of the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people, by the 7,000,000 Hutus.

The foreseeable intervention of the Zairian president will not necessarily solve the situation. Indeed, it is not impossible that Zaire, before the Belgian departure and in particular the hesitation of the O.A.U. [Organization of African Unity], sustained by MUSEVENI, could decide, for reasons of local prestige, to intervene once again, taking RWANDA under its supervision, without really having the means to do so. Current meetings within the C.E.P.G.L. (Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes: ZAIRE – BURUNDI – RWANDA) seem to demonstrate the probable manifestation of an intervention. It could materialize through the return of Zairian troops.

SIGNED: COL. GALINIE./.

G. MARTRES.

B

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

E8

RELEASED IN PART
NR

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)

"ROME FOR FOLAN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, USNATO
FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR AND HQ US
CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC J-5,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2005 200500286

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COMMANDER USASETAF FOR G-2"

1. (S) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR AFRICAN TRENDS 9/18/92

- A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
- B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
- C. NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE
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- E. NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING

- A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE

2. (C) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, FAILS. WHETHER THE PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT

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DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW MUCH POWER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS WILLING TO CEDE TO THE RPF AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION PARTIES. BUT TO BE ACCEPTED BY KIGALI (AND VIEWED AS LEGITIMATE BY THE RWANDAN PEOPLE). A TRUE SETTLEMENT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE RPF'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A POWERSHARING FORMULA MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TUTSIS' 10-15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAN WITH THE 50-50 SHARE THE RPF HAS BEEN DEMANDING.

3. (C) HABYARIMANA'S SIDE HAS BEEN PUSHED HARDER AND MORE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPROMISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THE RPF AND TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM MAJOR WESTERN DONORS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY CONTRAST ENJOYS SANCTUARY IN UGANDA AND IS NOT SO HEAVILY PRESSED BY KIGALI, OUTSIDERS, OR THE COSTS OF A WAR WHICH IS FOUGHT ON RWANDAN SOIL. IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE RPF WILL MAINTAIN A MORE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION. THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND STIR PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN THE PAST.

BACKGROUND

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4. (C) DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE NEGOTIATIONS
----- AND THE CONFLICT
BEHIND THEM ARE MULTIFACETED: HUTU-TUTSI TENSIONS; THE
EFFORT TO DECENTRALIZE POWER AND WEALTH NOW CONTROLLED
BY HABYARIMANA'S INNER CIRCLE; AND THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF WESTERN DONORS AND

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UGANDA.

5. (C) THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT LIES IN ETHNIC
TENSION BETWEEN THE TUTSIS--ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S
POPULATION OF 7 MILLION--AND THE HUTUS, WHO MAKE UP
ALMOST ALL THE REST. THE TUTSIS THE COUNTRY'S RULING
CLASS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WERE DISPLACED FROM THEIR
DOMINANT POSITION IN 1959 BY A COMBINATION OF ELECTIONS
AND HUTU UPRISINGS THAT KILLED THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS AND
CAUSED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.
ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR
REFUGEES (UNHCR), SOME 400,000 LONG-TERM RWANDAN
REFUGEES--VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM TUTSIS--LIVE IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. (C) THE RPF, BASICALLY A TUTSI ORGANIZATION. TRIED
TO GRAB POWER BY INVADING RWANDA FROM UGANDA ON OCTOBER
1, 1990. AFTER THE SURPRISE ATTACK WHICH SAW THE RPF
STRIKE AS FAR AS KIGALI, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR),
AIDED BY FRANCE, REGROUPED AND PUSHED BACK THE REBELS.
THE RPF STRUCK AGAIN IN JANUARY 1991 AND BRIEFLY
CAPTURED RUHENGERI BUT APPEARED TO WEAKEN IN THE
SUBSEQUENT RAINY SEASON. FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER A MARCH
CEASEFIRE. THE RPF RETREATED TO NORTHERN BORDER AREAS
AND CONDUCTED OCCASIONAL AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE
HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS. IN LATE 1991 IT BEGAN PRESSING ITS
ATTACKS WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS.

7. (C) THE RPF, WHOSE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
ARE PROMINENT HUTUS, PORTRAYS ITSELF AS A NATIONALIST
ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE HABYARIMANA REGIME'S

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CORRUPTION, ABUSES OF POWER, AND FAVORITISM TOWARD THE HUTUS OF NORTHERN RWANDA. THE LATTER FORM THE CORE OF REGIME SUPPORT. THE RPF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HUTU SUPPORT, BUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESONATE AMONG THE HUTUS ESPECIALLY IN NEWLY FORMED OPPOSITION PARTIES.

8. (C) NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. THE ARUSHA TALKS ARE
----- THE LATEST IN A LONG
PROGRESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS DATING BACK TO MID-OCTOBER
1990. THEY FOLLOW A MAY 1992 US OFFER TO PROVIDE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONCERT WITH NEIGHBORING STATES,
FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.

9. (C) EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED UNSUCCESSFULLY ON
ACHIEVING A LASTING CEASE-FIRE. THEY FAILED ALSO TO
MOVE THE TWO SIDES SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD A POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE
EARLIER ROUNDS, HELD IN DAR ES SALAAM IN FEBRUARY 1991,
THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSIS'
RIGHT OF RETURN PENDING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AND A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO A
CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS SHORT-LIVED. NEIGHBORING STATES
AGREED TO GRANT SANCTUARY TO THOSE TUTSIS WHO PREFERRED
NOT TO RETURN TO RWANDA. AND CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE WHO
DESIRED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE BROKE DOWN WHEN THE RPF
OBJECTED TO THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE
IMPARTIALITY OF MEDIATORS WAS QUESTIONED.

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10. (C) THE CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BEGAN WITH A JULY
MEETING IN ARUSHA WHICH RESULTED IN A CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS
HELD. THE PARTIES ALSO SET AN AGENDA CALLING FOR
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONCLUDED BY OCTOBER 10. A
FOLLOWUP MEETING IN AUGUST LED TO AGREEMENT ON
IMPLEMENTING "THE RULE OF LAW." A FURTHER ARUSHA ROUND
THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 7 FOCUSED ON POLITICAL
INTEGRATION--HOW TO BRING THE RPF INTO GOVERNMENT AND
HOW TO MODIFY AND LIBERALIZE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

11. (C) THE NEXT ROUND, TO BE HELD IN ARUSHA AFTER
OCTOBER 1, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT

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ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION BEFORE IT MOVES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY INTEGRATION.

HABYARIMANA UNDER PRESSURE

12. (C) DONORS, TUTSIS, AND REFORMS. AN

----- EX-

BELGIAN-TRAINED PARATROOPER WHO TOOK OVER IN A 1973 MILITARY COUP. HABYARIMANA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS FACED UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE FROM DONORS AND THE RPF TO REFORM HIS GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY HE WAS VIEWED AS A MODERATE ON THE QUESTION OF HUTU-TUTSI RELATIONS BECAUSE HE HAD REPLACED A HUTU-CHAUVINIST GOVERNMENT LED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU) AND HAD APPOINTED TUTSIS TO HIS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA'S POLICIES FAVORED NORTHERN HUTUS, MAINLY IN THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGERI AND GISENYI, HIS MDR-PARMEHUTU PREDECESSORS HAD JUST AS BLATANTLY FAVORED

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THE SOUTH.

13. (C) IN 1975 HABYARIMANA ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (MRND) AND MODIFIED THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE MRND THE SOLE LEGAL PARTY. FOR 15 YEARS, HOWEVER. INTERNATIONAL DONORS VIEWED RWANDA AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTRIES.

14. (C) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DISCONTENT BECAME MORE EVIDENT AFTER 1988. THE FALL IN INTERNATIONAL COFFEE PRICES IN 1989-90 STRAPPED RWANDA ECONOMICALLY AND HEIGHTENED DONOR PRESSURE FOR SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT REFORMS. INCREASINGLY, HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND IN-LAWS WERE CRITICIZED FOR CORRUPTION, AND HIS POLICY OF FAVORING THE NORTH AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER REGIONS WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS ACCEPTABLE. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, THE COLLAPSE OF EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM DISCREDITED RWANDA'S CENTRALIZED, ONE-PARTY RULE.

15. (C) HABYARIMANA ATTEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGES: ON JULY 5, 1990, HE ANNOUNCED A TWO-YEAR PROCESS TO MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY RULE, AND ON SEPTEMBER 21 HE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS TO SUGGEST WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION.

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LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, THE RPF INVASION BROUGHT NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO SOLVE THE TUTSI PROBLEM.

16. (C) THE WAR IS COSTLY TO RWANDA. IT HAS DISRUPTED
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH AND HAS DISPLACED SOME 350,000 RWANDANS, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). KIGALI MUST PAY FOR AN ARMY THAT HAS INCREASED IN SIZE FROM 5,000 IN OCTOBER 1990 TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 30,000. TO FINANCE THE WAR, KIGALI HAS BEEN FORCED TO SELL VIRTUALLY ITS ENTIRE COFFEE STOCKPILE AT A TIME WHEN WORLD PRICES ARE LOW. IT HAS INCREASED BORROWING FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND FALLEN BEHIND ON ITS PAYMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IN THIS SITUATION, KIGALI IS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN DONOR PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

17. (C) UNDER PRESSURE AS WELL FROM NEIGHBORING STATES INTERESTED IN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI REFUGEES IN THEIR TERRITORIES. HABYARIMANA IN LATE 1990 AND EARLY 1991 IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT BEGAN TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RESPOND TO TUTSI COMPLAINTS. HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSI RIGHT OF RETURN; ANNOUNCED ELIMINATION OF THE NOTATION OF ONE'S

ETHNIC BACKGROUND FROM NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS (WHICH HAD LONG ANGERED THE TUTSIS); AND FORMALLY LIFTED PRESS RESTRICTIONS (THOUGH JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO BE ARRESTED AND BEATEN).

18. (C) IN JUNE 1991, HABYARIMANA ACCEPTED MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS AND FORMALLY DECLARED RWANDA A MULTIPARTY STATE. HE RENAMED THE MRND AS THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND INVITED THE RPF TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS
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A LEGAL PARTY AND COMPETE WITH OTHER PARTIES
(CALCULATING THAT THE MINORITY TUTSIS COULD NOT WIN A

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SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE). TO DATE, 16 PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED, REPRESENTING A BROAD RANGE OF RWANDAN OPINION.

19. (C) AFTER NINE MONTHS OF SOMETIMES-ACRIMONIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HABYARIMANA IN APRIL 1992 AGREED TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT, GIVING 11 OF 20 CABINET SEATS TO FOUR OPPOSITION PARTIES. HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT APRIL' ALTHOUGH THIS SCHEDULE DEPENDS UPON THE RESULTS OF THE ARUSHA TALKS.

20. (C) DESPITE THE REFORMS, THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE POWER AND APPOINTS THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. KEY PORTFOLIOS--DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND CIVIL SERVICE--ARE HELD BY MRND LOYALISTS. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT NOW SHARES WITH A SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND REMOVE JUDGES, HE CONTINUES TO MANAGE A CENTRALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM AND APPOINTS LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS DOWN TO THE BURGOMASTER LEVEL.

21. (C) MULTIPARTY COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT
----- RETAINS ULTIMATE
AUTHORITY, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT--
OFTEN WORKING AS A BLOC--DO INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING.

22. (C) THE LARGEST AND APPARENTLY MOST POPULAR
OPPOSITION PARTY IS THE REFORMED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN
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MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH IS BASED ON THE OLD
MDR-PARMEHUTU. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, THE MDR APPEALS
MAINLY TO SOUTHERN HUTUS. ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES A
CONSERVATIVE WING THAT EXUDES MDR-PARMEHUTU'S HUTU
CHAUVINISM, ITS CORE LEADERSHIP IS FAR MORE LIBERAL AND
IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD END THE WAR

AND ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. PRIME MINISTER DISMAS
NSENGIYAREMYE IS FROM THE MDR, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER
CABINET MEMBERS INCLUDING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND COOPERATION BONIFACE NGULINZIRA.

23. (C) THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) AND THE SMALLER SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY EACH HOLD THREE CABINET POSITIONS
WHILE THE MINUSCULE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ONE.

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THE PL HAS A HEAVY TUTSI MEMBERSHIP ALTHOUGH SOME OF ITS LEADERS ARE HUTUS. LIKE THE MDR, IT FAVORS MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. LAST DECEMBER-JANUARY, FRUSTRATED WITH THE PL'S INITIAL REFUSALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HABYARIMANA LASHED OUT AT IT AS BEING THE INTERNAL WING OF THE RPF. OTHER HUTUS SHARE HIS VIEWS.

24. (C) WHAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON WITH THE RPF IS A DESIRE TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS. THEY ALL FAVOR MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION TO INCREASE THEIR OWN POWERS. BUT AS PART OF THE APRIL AGREEMENT WITH HABYARIMANA THAT GAVE THEM A CABINET MAJORITY AND THE PREMIERSHIP, THEY AGREED NOT TO TAKE MOVES TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.

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25. (C) THE DEGREE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' INFLUENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS HAS BEEN LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA. HE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO THE RPF IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PROPOSALS STATED. INTER ALIA, THAT: ALL PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CABINET; THE CABINET WOULD INCLUDE THE RPF; AND ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF WOULD HAVE LEGAL PRECEDENCE OVER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION AND CURRENT LAWS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH APPARENTLY WERE NOT APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HABYARIMANA. MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY KIGALI.

26. (C) THE HUTU RIGHT AND THE GENOCIDE CARD.

HABYARIMANA ALSO FACES PRESSURE FROM HUTU CHAUVINISTS CONCERNED WITH RETAINING ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH. ANTI-TUTSI FEELING, SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF HABYARIMANA'S TENURE IN OFFICE, REEMERGED AFTER THE RPF INVASION.

27. (C) THE MOST OBVIOUS POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF HUTU SUPREMACISM WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR) AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THE CDR'S CLEAR MESSAGE IS THAT HUTUS AND TUTSIS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLES WHO

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CAN DO NO BETTER THAN UNEASILY COEXIST. THE CDR APPEALS MAINLY TO NORTHERN HUTUS WHO HAVE BENEFITED MOST UNDER THE HABYARIMANA REGIME AND WHO ARE THREATENED BY THE RPF

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FIGHTING. HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND SOME OF HER FAMILY ARE THOUGHT TO BE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE CDR.

28. (C) BECAUSE OF THESE FAMILY TIES, HABYARIMANA SOMETIMES IS DESCRIBED AS A PRISONER OF THE FAR RIGHT. HIS REFORMS SUGGEST THAT THIS VIEW EXAGGERATES THE TRUTH. NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TUTSI COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ARE DISTURBING IN A SMALL COUNTRY WITH SUCH A CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY SYSTEM. SINCE THE RPF INVASION. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR EPISODES IN WHICH 300 OR MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN ANTI-TUTSI VIOLENCE, THE MOST RECENT IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE LAST MONTH. THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.

RPF PRESSES ITS ADVANTAGE

29. (C) COMPARED WITH KIGALI'S DECISIONMAKERS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE MORE UNIFIED, FOR NOW, AROUND A HARDLINE NEGOTIATING POSITION. SINCE 1990, IT HAS SKILLFULLY COMBINED ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING PUSHED INTO THE HINTERLANDS OF RUHENGERI AND THE AKAGERA AND VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARKS IN MID-1991, THE RPF CONSISTENTLY REJECTED HABYARIMANA'S REFORMS AND HIS INVITATION TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. WHEN IT RETURNED IN STRENGTH TO THE BATTLEFIELD LATE IN THE YEAR, THE RPF CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING A GUERRILLA EFFORT RATHER THAN ON STRIKING SUCH MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS RUHENGERI

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AND KIGALI.

30. (C) THE FAR, WHICH HAS BECOME MORE UNDISCIPLINED AND INEFFECTIVE AS IT HAS GROWN LARGER, HAS PROVED

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INCAPABLE OF DISLODGING THE REBELS. EARLIER THIS YEAR IT APPEARED TO BE SAVED FROM COLLAPSE ONLY BY THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS.

31. (C) THE RPF HAS SUCCEEDED THROUGH WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN WINNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATE AN RPF ROLE IN A FUTURE RWANDAN REGIME. EVEN THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE LONG BEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF HABYARIMANA' SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT THAT IS AT LEAST MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPF.

32. (C) THE PROBLEM IS FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. RPF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAVE ALTERNATED BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OBSTINACY. MUCH OF THE RPF'S ENERGY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CRITICIZING THE CORRUPTION AND HYPOCRISY OF THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, AN EASY TASK. THE RPF ENTERED THE ARUSHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CALLING FOR SCRAPPING THE CONSTITUTION AND REPLACING THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE WITH AN APPOINTED, ALL-POWERFUL NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RECONCILIATION THAT WOULD RULE THE COUNTRY DURING A FOUR-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD.

33. (C) THE RPF REJECTS INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM, PARTLY BECAUSE HABYARIMANA CONTINUES TO HOLD REAL POWER. IT HAS EVEN REJECTED A FORMULA THAT WOULD REDUCE HABYARIMANA'S POWERS SIGNIFICANTLY.

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34. (C) THE RPF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A MORE LIBERAL MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GUARANTEES, BECAUSE IT COULD NOT WIN SIGNIFICANT POWER THROUGH ELECTIONS WITHOUT FORMING A COALITION. EVEN IF ALL THE TUTSIS RETURNED TO RWANDA, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE NO MORE THAN 14 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S TOTAL POPULATION.

35. (C) WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO MILITARY INTEGRATION, THE RPF IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER OPENING LINE. PAUL KAGAME, THE RPF MILITARY COMMANDER AND DE FACTO LEADER OF THE REBELS. IN A JULY STATEMENT SAID: "WE SHALL INSIST ON A 50-PERCENT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL ARMY. THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT A DEFEATED ARMY." ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN KIGALI HAVE AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES TO THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING RPF FIGHTERS INTO THE

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ARMY, THE RPF'S OPENING POSITION IS A NONSTARTER.

36. (C) AT BOTTOM, THE RPF WANTS A SHARE OF POWER AS WELL AS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RPF MEMBERS AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT CAN ACHIEVE THESE AIMS WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IT PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT OUT OF PROPORTION

TO TUTSI NUMBERS FOR A LONG (FOUR-YEAR) TRANSITION PERIOD. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT ITS POSITION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, BUT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE GOVERNMENT'S BOTTOM LINE BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.

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PRESSURING THE RPF

37. (C) THE RPF HAS BEEN FAR LESS WILLING THAN THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD LITTLE TO LOSE BY CONTINUING ITS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT, IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO INTENSIFY THE REBELLION IF THE POLITICAL TRACK BOGS DOWN. RPF INTRANSIGENCE DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON UGANDA. WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS THE SITE OF THE RPF'S HEADQUARTERS.

38. (C) ALTHOUGH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS LITTLE BUT CONTEMPT FOR HABYARIMANA AND CLEARLY FAVORS A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE RPF WITH A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF POWER, HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF MAY BE SOFTENING. WHILE MUSEVENI DOES NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE REDUCED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, UGANDA AND RWANDA SIGNED A NONAGGRESSION TREATY IN AUGUST THAT PROVIDES FOR RWANDAN MONITORING TEAMS ON THE UGANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

39. (C) MOREOVER, IN THE SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA, UGANDAN OBSERVERS JOINED OBSERVERS FROM RWANDA'S OTHER NEIGHBORS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS. MUSEVENI EVEN SENT WORD THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RPF PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND FROM THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE RPF MIGHT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE

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SUPPORT FROM TUTSI SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDAN ARMY AND
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FROM WEALTHY TUTSIS IN THE REGION AND THE DIASPORA, THE
ONLY CLEAR WAY TO PRESSURE THE RPF APPEARS TO BE THROUGH
KAMPALA.

40. (C) BY HOLDING TO A HARD LINE, THE RPF RUNS OTHER
RISKS. FIRST, IT MAY ALIENATE THE INTERNAL PARTIES THAT
SHARE ITS INTEREST IN LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. IT
ALSO RISKS OFFENDING THE FOREIGN ACTORS--STATES IN THE
REGION, THE US, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM--WHOSE ATTENTION HAS
GIVEN THE RPF/TUTSI ISSUE A NEW DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL

LEGITIMACY. IT IS LIKELY THAT, WHILE PROFESSING A
WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND BY BEING TACTICALLY FLEXIBLE.
THE RPF WILL SEEK TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS LONG
AS POSSIBLE AND WAIT FOR KIGALI AGAIN TO LOWER ITS
BOTTOM LINE.

41. (C) BUT THE RPF IS IN A CATCH-22 SITUATION: IT
WILL RISK A HUTU BACKLASH IF IT IS GENERALLY SEEN BY THE
HUTU MAJORITY--OR BY HARDLINE HUTUS CLOSE TO
HABYARIMANA--AS MOVING TO REASSERT TUTSI HEGEMONY OVER
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. ANTI-TUTSI ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE
THAT' NO MATTER WHAT IS AGREED TO IN POWERSHARING TALKS,
THE RPF MUST TREAD A FINE LINE IF IT WISHES TO RETURN
PEACEFULLY TO RWANDA. IN THE END, THE RPF MAY DECIDE
THAT THE RISK OF RETURNING IS TOO GREAT. (EHRENREICH)

B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

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C. NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE

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
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
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D. NOTE: SUDAN: RELIEF CRISIS

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E. NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994

H/R 67

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-963-9852 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: NGEN BARIL	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.
2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.
3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.
5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

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FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY\FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR LOCATION. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE. HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE H HR. OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX: ALLONS-Y.

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	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01
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R 171259Z FEB 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5759
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USDAO PARIS
DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KIGALI 00750

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NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY

VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES

E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 28 MAR 2006 200103014

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2. THIS CABLE FULFILLS A DESIRABLESREPORTING REQUIREMENT.

3. SUMMARY. MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TRANSITION PROCESS AND DEMOCRACY VARY THROUGH THE RANKS; MID-LEVEL OFFICERS' SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS STRONGEST. BOTH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMY (RPA) BLAME POLITICIANS FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE UPCOMING TRANSITION INCLUDING COMMANDSJRDC CONTROL ISSUES REMAIN UNDEFINED FOR BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENT. ETHNIC PREJUDICES ON BOTH SIDES PERSIST AND WILL HAVE TO BE OVERCOME DURING INTEGRATED TRAINING. PROPER HANDLING OF FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION IS THE KEY TO SECURING MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE. END SUMMARY.

MILITARY ATTITUDES VARY ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS

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4. THE MILITARY IS NO LONGER A MONOLITHIC ONE PARTY INSTITUTION, WITH CONSISTENT ATTITUDES THROUGHOUT THE RANKS ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME SENIOR OFFICERS STILL SEE THEIR DESTINY TIED TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. MANY HAVE NOISY SKELETONS IN THEIR CLOSETS AND FEAR PROSECUTION FOR PAST CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE WITH THE RPF JOINING THEIR RANKS.

5. AMONG THE MID-LEVEL OFFICERS, THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT CAMPS. THERE ARE THE MRND LOYALISTS WHO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE RPF, WORKING FOR THE OUSTER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE FOR THEM ONLY REFLECTS THE RPF AND OPPOSITION EFFORTS TO ENSURE A MAJORITY IN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TO IMPEACH HABYARIMANA. THE OTHER CAMP WITHIN THE MID LEVELS SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT CHANGE IS INEVITABLE AND SUPPORTS THE MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY.

6. AT THE ENLISTED LEVEL, MANY EQUATE MULTIPARTYISM AND THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WITH THEIR IMMINENT DEMOBILIZATION SINCE MOST OF THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WILL COME FROM THE ENLISTED RANKS. THEIR BIGGEST CONCERNS ARE GETTING ADEQUATE TRAINING AND COMPENSATION

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ONCE THEY LEAVE THE MILITARY.

BOTH THE RGF AND RPA FRUSTRATED BY THE CURRENT IMPASSE

7. AT A RECENT NAVAL SCHOOL OF JUSTICE (NSJ) CONFERENCE
HELD IN KIGALI IN JANUARY 1994 ON THE ROLE OF THE

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MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY, MILITARY PARTICIPANTS FROM BOTH
THE RPA AND RGF EXPRESSED THEIR FRUSTRATION WITH THE
CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. RPF AND RGF OFFICERS
BELIEVED THAT THE POLITICIANS WERE HOLDING UP THE PEACE
PROCESS FOR SELF-INTERESTED REASONS AND IGNORING THE
NEEDS OF THE NATION.

8. THE MILITARY ON BOTH SIDES BOASTED ABOUT THEIR
ABILITY TO RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY,

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDAO YAOUNDE
USDAO PARIS
DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 KIGALI 00750

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NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY

VAHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES

E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

UNLIKE THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS. CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS POINTED AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE EASE WITH WHICH THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE GENDARMERIE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THE RPF FORCE COMMANDER AGREED ON THE MODE OF OPERATION WITHIN THE KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE AREA ESTABLISHED BY UNAMIR (UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA).

9. ALTHOUGH, THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR OBSTACLES PUT UP BY EITHER THE RGF OR RGF IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE PEACE PROCESS, COL. KARENZI, THE RPF LIAISON OFFICER TO UNAMIR, BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY'S WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS HAS NOT REALLY BEEN TESTED. THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS INVOLVING FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION HAVE YET TO BE DISCUSSED AND MAY RESULT IN SOME OF THE SAME TYPES OF IMPASSES CURRENTLY SEEN ON

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THE POLITICAL FRONT.

CHANGING ROLES, UNCERTAIN IDENTITY FOR THE MILITARY

10. THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF THE JANUARY NSJ CONFERENCE WAS
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TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A
DEMOCRACY. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AUGUSTIN BIZIMANA,
THE RPA COMMANDER GENERAL KAGAME AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER ANASTASE GASANA ALL EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE
FOR THE EMBASSY'S SPONSORSHIP OF THIS CONFERENCE. ALL
FELT THAT IT CREATED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG BOTH
CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY AS TO THE ROLE THE ARMED
FORCES SHOULD PLAY DURING THIS TRANSITION PERIOD AND
AFTER THE ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR 1995. THE LESSONS
LEARNED DURING THE CONFERENCE WERE IMPORTANT IN MAKING
THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MILITARY'S PAST ROLE
AND ITS CURRENT ONE.

11. DURING THE PERIOD 1973-1990, THE ARMED FORCES WERE
AN ORGAN OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE. THE ROLE OF THE
MILITARY WAS TO PROTECT THAT STATE, THE MRND PARTY AND
ITS PRESIDENT, MAJOR GENERAL JUVENAL HABYARIMANA. THE
PRESIDENT ALSO HELD THE FUNCTIONS OF MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE.
DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS WERE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF. ARMY OFFICERS HELD MINISTERIAL
POSITIONS, WERE ELECTED AS DEPUTIES, AND WERE APPOINTED
TO OTHER CIVILIAN JOBS.

12. WITH THE JUNE 1991 CONSTITUTION, POLITICAL PARTIES
WERE LEGALIZED. AN IMPORTANT CAVEAT IN THE POLITICAL
PARTIES LAW MADE PARTY MEMBERSHIP ILLEGAL FOR MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES. LATER, A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE
WAS APPOINTED BY THE FIRST MULTIPARTY TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1992. WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF
MULTIPARTYISM IN GOVERNMENT, THE ARMY'S ROLE CHANGED
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FROM THAT OF SUPPORT AND PROTECTION OF HABYARIMANA AND

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THE MRND TO APOLITICAL PROTECTOR OF A MULTIPARTY STATE.
YET AS THE NSJ CONFERENCE SHOWED THIS NEW ROLE WAS NEVER
WELL DEFINED FOR THE MILITARY OR ITS CIVILIAN MASTERS.

COMMAND AND CONTROL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE FOR THE MILITARY

13. DURING THE NSJ CONFERENCE, BOTH RGF AND RPA OFFICERS
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT IT MEANT FOR THE ARMY TO

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	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5761
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NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY

VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES

E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.

TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND BE UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL. RGF
OFFICERS SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF DEMOCRACY EQUALLED THE
GOVERNMENT, AND IF SO DID THEY GIVE THEIR LOYALTY AND
FOLLOW ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR THE PEOPLE. RGF

OFFICERS IN DEFENSE OF THE MILITARY CLAIMED THAT THEY
HAD FOUGHT IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY DURING THE PAST THREE
YEARS AND HAD BEEN UNDER CIVILIAN/DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AT
LEAST SINCE 1991 WITH THE NEW CONSTITUTION, TAKING
ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE CIVILIAN MINISTER OF
DEFENSE.

14. THE RPF AS WELL AS SOME OF THE CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS
IN THE CONFERENCE BEGGED TO DIFFER WITH THIS
INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMY. THE RPF
POINTED TO THE NUMEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY, ALLEGEDLY UNDER ORDERS FROM
THE PRESIDENT AND SOME OF HIS CIVILIAN PREFETS. ACTIONS
SUCH AS THESE, SAID THE RPF, WERE CLEARLY NOT ACTIONS IN
SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY.

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15. THIS DISCUSSION LED TO QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT

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ACTIONS WERE PROPER AND IMPROPER FOR THE ARMY TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY? THE NSJ TRAINERS RESPONDED THAT THE ARMY WAS TASKED TO UPHOLD THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. BOTH RGF AND RPF OFFICERS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE THEIR TASK IN RWANDA'S NEW MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY. THE RPF'S LINGERING CONCERN, THOUGH, IS THAT BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS RECEIVE SUFFICIENT POLITICAL/CIVIC EDUCATION TO BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HOW THIS APPLIES TO THE MINORITY.

MILITARY VIEWS ON ETHNICITY AND FORCE INTEGRATION

16. INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES (ESSENTIALLY INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT HUTU AND RPF TUTSI FORCES) IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 90 DAYS AFTER A BROAD BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN DOMINATED BY THE HUTU ETHNIC GROUP. WHILE SOME TUTSIS DID ENTER THE MILITARY, AND A FEW MADE IT INTO THE OFFICER CORPS, THE OUTBREAK OF WAR SAW MANY OF THEM ARRESTED AS COLLABORATORS OR FORCED INTO RESERVE STATUS. THE WAR ITSELF FOR MOST MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HUTU ARMY AND THE TUTSI INVADERS. RGF OFFICERS BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT ETHNICITY MAY INITIALLY POSE A PROBQDUFRHINOEGRAYION.

17. FOR EXAMPLE, ECONOFF SPOKE TO RGF HIGH COMMAND
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OFFICERS WHO ARE STILL WARY OF THE "TUTSI RPF". IN PARTICULAR, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MAJOR GENERAL NSABIMANA, STILL THINKS THAT THE TUTSI AIM REMAINS UNCHANGED -- TOTAL POWER. ACCORDING TO NSABIMANA, RPF OFFICERS IN THE HIGH COMMAND WILL ACT AS INFILTRATORS, ASSISTING THE RPF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE PLANNING OF A COUP FROM WITHIN, AND THUS ACCOMPLISHING THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF TOTAL POWER. IN HIS ASSESSMENT, THE TIMING FOR SUCH A COUP WILL COME AFTER AN RPF LOSS IN THE ELECTIONS AFTER THE UN MANDATE IS OVER AND UN TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN. (NOTE: MGEN NSABIMANA HAS BEEN NAMED BY THE GOVNRNMENT SIDE TO CONTINUE IN HIS ROLE AS ARMY CHIEF OF

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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY

VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES

E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.

TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

STAFF OF THE INTEGRATED FORCES.)

18. FOR OFFICERS AT THE MID LEVEL, HOWEVER, THE ETHNIC TENSIONS ARE NOT SO PRONOUNCED. THE GOODWILL DISPLAYED AT THE NSJ CONFERENCE BETWEEN RGF AND RPA OFFICERS SUGGESTED THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES COULD BE SHORT LIVED IN THE NEWLY INTEGRATED ARMY. BY THE SECOND DAY OF THE CONFERENCE, RGF AND RPF OFFICERS WERE TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES LIKE LONG-LOST BROTHERS. ONE REMARKABLE INCIDENT DURING THE CONFERENCE WAS SEEING AN RPF AND AN RGF OFFICER LEAVING THE MESS HALL TOGETHER HAND-IN-HAND. (HAND HOLDING AMONG MEN IN RWANDA IS AN ACCEPTABLE CUSTOM, DENOTING FRIENDSHIP.)

19. IN THE ENLISTED RANKS, THE RPF SOLDIERS WERE PROVIDED POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE FIELD. ALL WERE TAUGHT THE RPF POLITICAL PROGRAMME THAT THE NATURE OF THE THREE YEAR CONFLICT WAS NOT ETHNIC BUT RATHER ONE OF FIGHTING AGAINST A DICTATORIAL REGIME FOR THE RIGHTS OF ALL RWANDANS. BY COMPARISON, MOST OF THE RGF ENLISTED WERE GIVEN VERY LITTLE TRAINING AND TAUGHT THAT TUTSIS WERE THEIR ENEMY. INTEGRATED TRAINING OF THE ENLISTED

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WILL HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE ETHNIC PREJUDICES MANY WILL BRING TO THEIR PLATOONS. "ENEMY" WILL HAVE TO BE REDEFINED AND DISASSOCIATED FROM "TUTSI" OR "HUTU".

SCENARIOS FOR UPCOMING DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION

20. ENTERING INTO THE THIRD PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN WHICH UNAMIR WILL OVERSEE DISARMAMENT, FORCE INTEGRATION, AND DEMOBILIZATION, THE MILITARY COULD RESPOND TO THESE CHANGES IN THREE POSSIBLE WAYS. FIRST IS THAT WHICH ALL WOULD HOPE FOR: THAT THE MILITARY

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ADJUSTS TO AND ACCEPTS ITS NEW ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, AND THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS IN 1995.

21. A SECOND POSSIBLE RESPONSE COULD BE A MUTINY AMONG LOWER-LEVEL OFFICERS, WITHOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING POLITICAL POWER, IN WHICH UNDISCIPLINED SOLDIERS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP FROM THE OFFICER CORPS. SUCH A MUTINY COULD BE TRIGGERED BY FEARS OF DEMOBILIZATION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION OR TRAINING OR BY THE ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTEGRATED RGF AND RPF UNITS.

22. A THIRD POSSIBILITY IS A COUP EITHER BY THOSE IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT SHOULD THERE BE AN IMPEACHMENT
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ATTEMPT OR IN THE NEAR TERM BY THOSE FROM THE OPPOSITION INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WHO WANT CHANGE AND ARE FRUSTRATED WITH THE POLITICAL IMPASSE (WHICH THEY BLAME ON THE PRESIDENT). AN RPF COUP, USED AS A TACTIC TO SHIFT THE POLITICAL BALANCE, STRATEGICALLY SIMILAR TO THE FEBRUARY 1993 OFFENSIVE, IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY RAISED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

23. GENERAL DALLAIRE, THE UN FORCE COMMANDER HAS CONSIDERED EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS, AND ADJUSTED HIS FORCE STRATEGY AND DEPLOYMENT TO COVER "WEAK FLANKS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTORS. FEARS OF A COUP FROM THE PRO-HUTU RIGHT CONTINUE WITH RUMORS OF INTERHAMWE (RWANDAN, PRO-HUTU EXTREMISTS) AND PALIPEHUTU (BURUNDI, PRO-HUTU EXTREMISTS) TRAINING IN BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00	EUR-01
	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01
	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	/040W				

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R 171259Z FEB 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5763
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDAO YAOUNDE
USDAO PARIS
DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 KIGALI 00750

DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PHO
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NEWPORT FOR ASELTIME, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY

VAIHINGEN FOR LT. :9) '3-,3:

E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.

TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW

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SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

SOUTHERN BORDER. CONCERNS ABOUT A PRO-RPF COUP FROM THE LEFT STILL LINGER WITH THE UNEASE IN BURUNDI AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BURUNDI TUTSI-DOMINATED ARMY COULD TURN TO THE NORTH TO HELP ITS RPF BRETHREN SEIZE POWER. THE RESULTS OF ANY COUP WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND COULD RESULT IN ETHNIC BACKLASH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE SIMILAR TO THAT WITNESSED IN BURUNDI.

24. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A COUP D'ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARD

39,
FROM BURUNDI WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST SUCH ACTIONS. LEADERSHIP FOR A COUP IS LACKING AS WELL. AND GIVEN THE DIVISIONS ALREADY IN THE MILITARY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE WHOLE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTIONS NO MATTER WHO THE LEADER OR WHAT THE OBJECTIVES WERE.

COMMENT:

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25. WHETHER THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IS UNCERTAIN. LTCOL KARENZI AND LTCOL RWABALINDA, RPA AND RGF LIAISON OFFICERS TO UNAMIR, BOTH CONTENTEND THAT THE LEADERS AT THE TOP ARE ONLY PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THE PROCESS BUT DON'T REALLY SUPPORT ITS IMPLEMENTATION IF IT AFFECTS THEIR POWER BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE CRITICAL TO MILITARY SUPPORT (OUTSIDE THE HIGH COMMAND) FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL. IMPROPERLY HANDLED, DEMOBILIZATION AND FORCE INTEGRATION COULD BE THE WILD CARDS IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IN RWANDA. RAWSON

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Telex #64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU

(sent by Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff, M. Willems, while Claes is still in Kigali) February 25, 1994

Source:

[http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?](http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr)

[MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr](http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr)

“The situation’s significant deterioration, in terms of security in Rwanda, calls for the following reflections:

1. The political assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety, could well lead to a new bloodbath.

2. It will be necessary to increase diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve strict enforcement of the Arusha Accords in a calm environment.

3. The Special Representative of the General Secretary in Rwanda, Mr. Booh Booh, seems to have lost his local credibility.

4. Under its current mandate, UNAMIR cannot firmly maintain public order. There is a serious credibility problem.

Steps have already been taken at a high level in New York, but they have remained without result. The Security Council president’s last declaration concerning Rwanda (February 7th, 1994), “UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha Peace Agreement fully and rapidly,” suggests possible inactivity or stoppages of the operation.

5. Amidst assassinations and unrest, UNAMIR decided at the beginning of this week to put the operation on red alert, and consequently all the Blue Berets received the order to withdraw to their encampments and wait passively. If the situation had indeed degenerated and the aforementioned orders had stayed in effect, it would have been unacceptable, in the public opinion, for Belgian Blue Berets to be passive witnesses to genocide in Rwanda and for the United Nations to do nothing.

6. If conditions deteriorate, the United Nations and Belgium cannot really afford to withdraw from Rwanda. UNAMIR should be able to play a more active role and adopt a more marked profile in order to reinforce the international community’s credibility.

7. *The question is to know whether this is possible without a new mandate from the Security Council. If attempting to strengthen UNAMIR requires a new mandate (a new Security Council resolution), we can expect difficulties, given the current policy in the United States on the matter. At this time, an extension of the operation (Blue Berets, financing) seems impossible in their view. Moreover, in the two resolutions themselves (872, 893), emphasis is clearly placed on the limited or recessive character of the operation (without putting UNAMIR's capability of fulfilling its mission at stake).*

8. *It has become very important to examine how we could strengthen the action within the framework of the current mandate (integration of Austrian Blue Berets? A larger margin of decision for Dallaire? Provisional displacement of Blue Berets from other operations in the region? ...), and how to effectively augment diplomatic and political pressure.*

9. *I would appreciate your remarks about all this. I insist that this must serve as a base for any decision concerning eventual future steps, but as of yet no stance has been reached on this subject.” (532b).*

Reply from Ambassador Noterdaema, Telex 326. February 28, 1994

The response is negative on the question of strengthening the United Nations action. Ambassador Noterdaeme, in his telex #326 on February 28th, 1994, declares that he has “*thought seriously about the way we could influence the United Nations’ action in Rwanda.*” He adds, “*I talked about it in detail with the principal members of the Security Council and with the Secretary of the United Nations. In theory, there are four elements on which we could draw:*

1) The expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate or the strengthening of its numbers: ‘very improbable’

Not only are the United States and the United Kingdom against it, they may even, according to their delegations, withdraw UNAMIR altogether ‘in case of difficulties’ (this could even be the attitude of the entire Security Council.) There is a ‘financial logic’ behind this (the United States never wanted more than 500 men for UNAMIR).

There is also a political logic: the operations in Rwanda, Liberia, and Mozambique are covered under Chapter VI; in other words, the United Nations Security Council cannot impose a solution (in Yugoslavia and Somalia, this proved to be impossible even under Chapter VII).

2) The rules of engagement

The United Nations Secretary “is not inclined to adjust the rules of engagement.”

Militarily, it is too dangerous; the United Nations never has as much power as the parties;

Politically: if the United Nations uses force, it takes a side (is no longer neutral)” (524b).